



# METROPOLIS 2002

SEOUL MAY 27-31

## Commission 1

The impact of major events on the development of large cities



# COMMISSION 1

## THE IMPACT OF MAJOR EVENTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE CITIES

### COMMISSION'S REPORT

#### **Chair**

Paris Ile-de-France

#### **Vice-Chair**

Berlin

#### **Technical coordination**

Institut d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme  
de la Région Ile-de-France (Paris)

Paul Lecroart

Hélène Sallet-Lavorel

#### **Cities**

Abidjan

Barcelona

Berlin

Melbourne

Paris Ile-de-France

Rio de Janeiro

Sevilla

Shenyang

Seoul

Toronto

The Hon. Tom Roper (Sydney)

**Report drafting:**

Paul Lecroart et Hélène Sallet-Lavorel,  
IAURIF, Paris

**Editor:**

Cristina Piquemal,  
Secretariat General of Metropolis

**Translation to English:**

Discobole (Richard Jacques),  
Barcelona, Spain

**Translation to Spanish:**

Discobole (Nuria Caminero),  
Barcelona, Spain

The French and Spanish version of this report can be found on the Metropolis Website: **[www.metropolis.org](http://www.metropolis.org)**

The contributions of members to the work of Commission 1 can be found on the site.

**Cover photograph:**

The Stade de France during World Cup 1998  
© Dreif - Gauthier

© 2002, World Association of the Major Metropolises, Metropolis  
Ajuntament de Barcelona  
Plaça Sant Jaume, 1 08002 Barcelona (Spain)  
[metropolis@mail.bcn.es](mailto:metropolis@mail.bcn.es)  
[www.metropolis.org](http://www.metropolis.org)

First edition, April 2002

Graphic design: Dario Grossi

Printed: Treballs Gràfics, SA  
Santander, 74 08020 Barcelona

ISBN: 84-7609-956-8  
Copyright Deposit: 18934-2002

# CONTENTS

CHAIRMAN'S FOREWORD .....	5
GENERAL INTRODUCTION .....	7
<b>PART I – SUMMARY REPORT</b>	
INTRODUCTION .....	9
1. DIVERSITY OF THE CASES STUDIED .....	11
1.1 The characteristics of the cities .....	11
1.2 Quite different events .....	11
2. THE CITIES' GOALS .....	15
2.1 Image and international recognition .....	15
2.2 Economy and tourism .....	15
2.3 Urban development .....	16
2.4 Specific .....	16
3. WHAT EFFECTS DO THE MAJOR EVENTS HAVE ON THE CITIES? .....	17
3.1 Image .....	17
3.2 Regional and urban planning .....	18
3.3 The environment .....	20
3.4 Economic and touristic development .....	21
3.5 Public finances .....	25
3.6 The people involved .....	27
4. BRINGING OFF A MAJOR EVENT: FAVOURABLE FACTORS .....	29
4.1 Long-term vision and strategy .....	30
4.2 Preparation and organisation of the event .....	31
4.3 Exploitation after the event .....	34
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	39
5.1 Organising a major event: a luxury for rich cities? .....	39
5.2 Strengthening the internal solidarity of cities .....	40
5.3 Strengthening the cities' organisation capacity .....	40
5.4 Strengthening international cooperation .....	42
<b>PART II – CASE STUDIES</b>	
INTRODUCTION .....	45
Data sheet n° 1 Barcelona: from the 1992 Olympic Games to the Universal Forum of Cultures 2004 .....	47
Data sheet n° 2 Berlin: from the bid for the 2000 Olympic Games to the preparation of the 2006 Football World Cup .....	53
Data sheet n° 3 Melbourne: the 2006 Commonwealth Games .....	57
Data sheet n° 4 Paris Ile-de-France: the 1998 Football World Cup .....	60
Data sheet n° 5 Rio de Janeiro: The Carnival .....	64
Data sheet n° 6 Seville: from the 1992 Universal Exhibition to the 1999 World Athletics Championships .....	66
Data sheet n° 7 International Amities Event Mont, Shenyang 1999 .....	72
Data sheet n° 8 Toronto: World Youth Days Conference 2002 .....	74

## CONTRIBUTIONS

Contribution 1. Strategic city marketing as a key-issue of successful mega sporting events. The experience of the 1998 Olympics and the Challenges for the 2002 World Cup in Seoul, Korea .....	81
Contribution 2. Olympic Games in Berlin?.....	91
Contribution 3. The Sports Promotion Office, a tool for the everyday preparation of the candidature for the Olympic Games .....	93
Contribution 4. The Sydney Olympics and their impact on development.....	95
Contribution 5. The Rio "Sambodrome": what uses for a large urban facility?.....	99
Contribution 6. The Paris 2003 Saint-Denis World Athletics Championships: Legacy of the 1998 World Cup and the issues involved .....	103
Contribution 7. Town-planning issues connected with the organisation of the 2004 Seine Saint-Denis International Exhibition.....	105
Contribution 8. Barcelona between two events: the 1992 Olympic Games and Forum 2004: economic and urban development effects.....	109

## NOTES

Note 1. Strategy .....	125
Note 2. Town-planning and urban development .....	131
Note 3. Transport and flow management .....	139
Note 4. Tourism, reception and festivities.....	143
Note 5. Socio-economic impact .....	149
Note 6. Financial impact.....	153
Note 7. Security .....	157

## CHAIRMAN'S FOREWORD

The organisation of major sporting or cultural events is a crucial time in the lives of big cities. It provides them with an opportunity to promote themselves, their energy and creativity and, increasingly, their competitiveness. But it also involves exchanging experiences in this field so as to control the effects, minimise possible risks and guarantee positive results as far as possible.

Paris Ile-de-France, which has occupied the presidency of this Commission, and Berlin, which has been vice-president, attach particular importance to the matter of major sporting or cultural events.

The universal exhibitions turned out to be catalysts for the transformation of the city. With the 1998 Football World Cup, the new Stade de France has become the engine of a regional urban redevelopment area, and other challenges will arise tomorrow with the 2004 Seine-Saint-Denis International Exhibition.

And so I hope that this report, drafted with the technical support of IAURIF, will enable other cities to clarify their decisions about projects which are always destined to leave an enduring mark on their territories and their residents.

Jean-Paul Huchon  
*President of the Ile-de-France Regional Council*  
*Vice-president of Metropolis*



# GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Commission 1 began work in the first half of 2000. Its goals were:

- to collect the experience of cities which had organised major sports and cultural events
- to measure the effect those events might have on the development of the cities on different territorial scales
- to think about the lessons to be learned, notably in terms of identification of the success and risk factors.

The ultimate aim of those thoughts was to provide elements to help big cities that were considering submitting bids for the organisation of such events with their decision-making.

The work of the Commission has drawn mainly on a survey launched in October 2000 in the fourteen cities that were members of the Commission at the time. The questionnaire had two components: one to do with the general framework of the city and its expectations in terms of work; the other on the results of past events, notably concerning image, urban planning, economic development and financing. The members of the Commission that had prepared a bid in the past or were currently preparing an event were also invited to complete the questionnaire.

Eight cities replied, and some of them sent several case studies. The events are:

- Barcelona: 1992 Olympic Games and Universal Forum of Cultures 2004
- Berlin: bid for the 2000 Olympic Games and the 2006 Football World Cup
- Melbourne: 2006 Commonwealth Games
- Paris Ile-de-France: 1998 Football World Cup
- Rio: annual Carnival
- Seville: 1992 Universal Exhibition and 1999 World Athletics Championships
- Shenyang: International Amities Event Month, 1999
- Toronto: World Youth Days, 2000

A case file with a summary of the information in each questionnaire was drafted.

Two other members of the Commission chose to take part in the work in the form of general contributions about the following events:

- Seoul: 1988 Olympic Games and 2002 Football World Cup
- Sydney: 2000 Olympic Games

All in all the report has been drafted on the basis of the fourteen events studied, of which eight took place between 1988 and 2000, which provides an interesting degree of hindsight to measure the effects. The five events in preparation enable us to observe how the cities conceive the organisation of such projects today. A rejected bid, Berlin for the Olympic Games in 2000, has also been analysed.

In the framework of this study, the Commission has also drawn on:

- Two work meetings, in June 2000 in Paris and in May 2001 in Rio
- The complementary contributions of Barcelona, Berlin, Rio and Seville, bearing on certain particularly interesting aspects of their experience as events organisers
- A contribution from Paris Ile-de-France which has taken the shape of an in-depth study of the effects of the 1998 Football World Cup in the city
- The use of available bibliographical sources on the subject. Certain big events which have not been studied by the Commission but are particularly well documented elsewhere have provided reference elements: to take one example, the analyses published of the effects of the International Exhibition in Lisbon in 1998, which provided a perspective on the 1992 Universal Exhibition in Seville



This report is in two parts:

- Part I, a summary report of the work of the Commission
- Part II, with eight data sheets analysing 11 events

The work of Metropolis Commission 1 has been collected in a dossier entitled “Cities’ experiences” accessed through the Metropolis website. This dossier presents the following contributions:

- An analysis of the Seoul city marketing strategy from the 1988 Olympic Games to the 2002 World Cup
- a presentation of two city strategies, Berlin and Seville, for the Olympic Games
- a balance sheet for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games and their effect on the development of the city
- an analysis of the problems encountered by Rio de Janeiro with the use of the Sambodrome outside the Carnival
- a presentation of certain issues connected with the coming organisation in Ile-de-France of the 2003 Paris Saint-Denis World Athletics Championships and the 2004 Seine Saint-Denis International Exhibition
- an unpublished assessment of the effects of the Barcelona 1992 Olympic Games and the prospects opened up by the Forum 2004 project
- a study of the effects of the 1998 World Football Cup drafted by the Commission coordinators in the form of seven notes by subjects: Strategy; urban planning and urban development; Transport and flow management; Tourism, reception and festivities; Socio-economic impact; Financial impact; Security.

# PART I

## SUMMARY REPORT

### INTRODUCTION

Before presenting the results of the Commission's work, it is worth recalling the methodological constraints to which any a *posteriori* assessment is subject.

To measure the effect of an event on the development of a city is a complex task which spreads over a number of quite different spheres: economy, society, tourism, public finance, infrastructures, town-planning and environment, but also international reputation, organisation capacity, metropolitan governance, public confidence, etc.

First, the effect is measured in relation to goals, which means that those goals are known from the start. But it must be borne in mind that the goals officially listed by the cities are not always enough to appraise the success of an event. Then, to estimate the effect of an event, certain indicators should have been in place from the beginning of the project, which is rarely the case in practice. Lastly, in a context where major events have become communication instruments in the worldwide competition in which the cities are engaged, it is sometimes delicate to obtain elements if they are to be presented in a less favourable light.

The material gathered by the Commission, which is very high quality, shows that above and beyond the diversity of the cases studied (chapter 1), the cities' goals are very close to one another (chapter 2).

Most of the potential effects of major events on the development of a city have been observed and analysed (chapter 3).

Some factors which are favourable for the success of the preparation of the events, their organisation and their exploitation in the long term have been identified (chapter 4).

Lastly, the report comes to conclusions about the place of major events in world competition and puts forward some recommendations aimed mainly at strengthening solidarity and cooperation among the cities (chapter 5).



# 1. DIVERSITY OF THE CASES STUDIED

## 1.1 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CITIES

Among the fourteen cities studied, three are the political capitals of their countries (Berlin, Paris, Seoul) and two are the economic capitals of federal states (Sydney, Toronto). Three of them may be considered 'challengers', often rivaling the main city (Barcelona, Melbourne, Rio de Janeiro). Two are rather 'outsiders', cities that occupy an important place inside their countries (Seville, Shenyang).

If we reckon in terms of how famous they are and how open to the world, we have one city whose world rank has been recognised for ages (Paris), cities that are still trying to boost their international position (Barcelona, Berlin, Rio, Sydney, Seoul, Toronto) or their national one (Melbourne, Seville, Shenyang), each for different reasons.

The cities are not evenly distributed around the world: four of them are in Europe, two in America, two in Northern Asia, two in Australia, but none in Africa or Central or Southern Asia. The climate, geographical location and urban structure vary widely among them.

In terms of population, the size of the metropolitan areas, not all of which have a government of their own, varies from 1.2 million (Seville) to around 10 million inhabitants (the Paris, Rio and Seoul conurbations). The size of the cities hosting events (the municipal authority) varies greatly from one case to another: the town of Saint-Denis, near Paris, where the Stade de France is located and the main matches of the 1998 World Cup were held, has only 90,000 inhabitants, whilst Shenyang (China) has 6.8 million.

The standard of the facilities (accommodation, *ad hoc* installations) and the quality of the transport infrastructures (airports, motorways, public transport, telecommunications) vary considerably from one city to another. From that point of view the biggest cities and the tou-

rist destinations are favoured (Paris, Rio, Barcelona, Berlin, Melbourne, Sydney, Toronto).

Experience in the organisation of major events also differs greatly from one city to another. Barcelona, Seoul, Seville, Sydney and Paris already have long experience of organising world events which have brought about major transformations in the city. Berlin, Melbourne, Rio, Shenyang and Toronto have regularly hosted international events.

## 1.2 QUITE DIFFERENT EVENTS

All in all, the major events studied answer to the criteria which had been defined beforehand by the Commission:

- Criterion 1: event of an exceptional nature
- Criterion 2: giving rise to large investments
- Criterion 3: involving lasting transformations in the city
- Criterion 4: attracting a large number of visitors
- Criterion 5: receiving international media coverage

By way of contrast, two particular cases enable us to better grasp the specific factors of 'exceptional' events. The annual Carnival in Rio de Janeiro does not meet the first criterion, but it has considerable repercussions on the city. The World Youth Days in Toronto do not meet criterion 3, but they show what an event which does not require major public investment can give a city.

If the fourteen cases studied have many points in common, linked to the scope of the projects, the complexity of the organisation, the deadlines, etc., they nevertheless show the enormous diversity of the events.

### 1.2.1 Nature of the event

Among the events studied there is a first distinction to be made between the sports competitions (Olympic Games, World Championships and Cups) and the cultural gathe-



Since the mid 19th century, the Universal Exhibitions have transformed Paris.

rings (Universal Exhibitions, international forums, Carnival). The first are based on friendly competition between countries, the second on encounter and exchange in the broadest sense, including the economic, social and religious aspects. The sports competitions also have an essential cultural dimension and there are usually a host of artistic events (parades, exhibitions, concerts, carnivals) to go with them.

The nature of the event determines the profile of those taking part and the degree of public involvement (sport is generally popular).

#### 1.2.2 Initiative and preliminary selection

The degree of autonomy of the organisation of an event is an essential differentiation criterion. Certain events have been the object of a bid with international bodies, whether by the government (Football World Cups), or a local authority (Olympic Games, Commonwealth Games, World Athletics Championships). Others spring from an autonomous municipal initiative (Rio Carnival, International Amities Event Month in Shenyang), which can be supported by an international body (Barcelona Universal Forum of Cultures). Others are private initiatives supported by a city (World Youth Days, Toronto).

#### 1.2.3 Scope of the event

Some of the cases studied concern landmark world events (Olympic Games, Football World Cup, World Athletics Championships, Universal Exhibitions), others are regional or plurinational ones (Shenyang International Amities Event Month, Commonwealth Games).

Some events require an enormous amount of infrastructures, both general and specific (Olympic Games, World Cup), whose later use has to be considered, whilst others do not involve any large investments (World Youth Days, Carnival). The competitions which include a

large number of sports disciplines and countries, such as the World Athletics Championships and most of all the Olympic Games, pose serious organisational problems (access to the venues, etc.). However, when the competitors belong to a similar cultural or linguistic area, like the Commonwealth Games, things are easier.

#### 1.2.4 Preparation time and duration

The preparation time for the events studied varies from one to another: about one year for the International Amities Event Month in Shenyang, about five years for France'98 or the World Youth Days in Toronto, from eight to ten years for most of the other events.

The duration of the events varies from a few days (three for the Rio Carnival, five to six for the World Youth Days) to about a month (Shenyang, Football World Cup) or several (six months for Expo'92 in Seville). Concentration in a short period is very demanding in terms of staff (volunteers and waged). A longer duration, even in the case of the very long ones, spreads out the constraints, but means keeping up a good level of involvement.

### Characteristics of four world events

#### Universal Exhibitions

First international exhibition: London 1851. A convention in 1928 set up the Bureau international des Expositions and laid down a few simple rules, listing the characteristics of international exhibitions:

- Universal Exhibitions (called 'registered') must be held at five year intervals, deal with a universal theme, last for six months and the size of the site is unlimited.

– International Exhibitions (called 'specialised') can be held between two universal exhibitions, must have a single, specialised theme and must last three months at the most. The surface area of the sites must be 25 hectares or less. In the past, universal exhibitions were showcases for avant-garde technology (telephone, television) and architectural prowess (Eiffel Tower, Atomium). But as time went by the themes of the exhibitions turned towards more humanistic, ecological and sustainable development issues (the next one, to be held in Aichi in 2005, will be on the theme of 'The wisdom of Nature'). Given the evolution of the attendance figures above all, we might wonder whether this type of large gathering is still suitable for the aspirations and requirements of tourism today, in search of greater simplicity and spontaneity in exchanges and encounters and a greater concern with ethics.

### **Olympic Games**

First modern Olympic Games: 1896. First Winter Olympic Games: 1924. The Games are held every four years in a different place and since 1994 the Summer and Winter Games have alternated. A planetary sports event (199 countries took part in the Sydney Games in 2000), they include 28 sports and over 500 events and last about two weeks. The Games are organised by a city and the main criteria for acceptance of bids are: support from the government and public opinion, general infrastructure, sports infrastructure, Olympic Village, environment, conditions and effects, accommodation, transport, past

experience in hosting sports events and general concept. The competitions involve dozens of sites and sports venues.

### **Football World Cup**

First World Cup: 1930 in Uruguay. The World Cups are organised by one or more governments and take place in several cities, using a large number of stadiums. They last one month and 32 countries take part in the final phase of the competitions; the selections are held beforehand. In 2002, 62 matches will be held in Korea and Japan.

### **World Athletics Championships**

Created in 1983, the World Athletics Championships have been held every other year since 1991. They last ten consecutive days and are organised at a main site. A large number of countries take part (210 at Saint-Denis in 2003) in over 40 disciplines (about 24 for men and 21 for women).



## 2. THE CITIE'S GOALS

The goals pursued by the cities which embark on the adventure of major events are very similar overall. They can be grouped in four broad categories: image and international recognition, economic and tourist, town-planning and specific; they vary from one city to another. It is from those goals, whether explicit or not, that we can assess the effects of the events.

### 2.1 IMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

The great world events are an opportunity for the cities to take their place on the international scene and often to show themselves at their best to an audience that has become planetary since the advent of television.

Cities which are already known all over the world such as Paris or Rio use the big events to boost their place as leaders and show off their energy.

For the other cities, the events are a way of attaining the status of great world city and making themselves known by proving their capacity to organise very complex projects. That is the case of Seoul, which has opened up to the world and taken a strong place in the region since the 1988 Olympic Games.

Some cities take advantage of the image of energy and competitiveness associated with top level sport. Berlin and Seville have integrated the major events into their marketing strategy. Through its bid for the Olympic Games and participation in the organisation of the Football World Cup in 2006, Berlin is seeking to show the world that it is a modern, lively, international city and to affirm its new role as capital of Germany. Seville has created a particular structure to support the sporting aspirations it hopes to further: the Sports Promotion Bureau.

The major events can also form part of the national strategy of certain cities to assert themselves against the capital, as seems to be the case of Rio, Barcelona or Shenyang.

In some cases the goal is to transform or modernise perception of the city. Barcelona, for example, is following an image strategy with its project for the Universal Forum of Cultures in 2004. Its position is a break with the great events based on competition between countries. In the context of the debates on globalisation, Barcelona wants to invent a new kind of international cultural event based on solidarity, peace, exchange and the cultural diversity of the world. Likewise, with the organisation of the World Youth Days in 2002, Toronto would like to appear as a cosmopolitan, welcoming, tolerant, generous and peaceful city.

Similarly, on the scale of a whole country, one of the goals of the Olympic Games in 2008 and the Universal Exhibition in Shanghai in 2010 is to allow China to open up to the world.

### 2.2 ECONOMY AND TOURISM

The organisation of a major event can act as a spur to economic development and a way of attracting investors. That is the case of Shenyang, which was very interested in attracting foreign investment when it organised the International Amities Event Month in 1999; it is the case of Barcelona which, with its Forum 2004 project, hopes to improve its economic position by launching a new area set aside for new economy activities.

In most cases it is also a way of maintaining or expanding the tourist sector. It seems that one of the goals of the Universal Exhibition in Hanover was to strengthen





In Shenyang, the major events are a way of attracting foreign investors.

the city's position on the international trade fair market and to become more competitive in the business tourism sphere by making the Exhibition Park more accessible.

The organisation of the Football World Cup in 2002 in Seoul is part of an urban marketing strategy. Its purpose is to be seen from outside as a 'hub city in North-East Asia', both energetic and diverse. The visible targets are tourists from the developed countries, investors and companies, in particular the ones that are at the cutting edge in the digital and image technologies sector.

### 2.3 URBAN DEVELOPMENT

For 150 years with the first Universal Exhibitions, the major events have been conceived as accelerators for big urban transformation projects and showcases for the architectural modernity of the city. That tendency is being consolidated: most of the cities studied consider that the implementation of their town-planning and urban development objectives is at least as important as the event itself.

Those goals, which are often set in a long-term strategic plan, take different forms, which often combine:

- the modernisation and improvement of the city infrastructures, notably transport (airport, motorway network, fast rail connections and telecommunications network). That goal can be found in all the cases where deficiencies have been identified: Seoul in 1988, Barcelona and Seville in 1992, etc.;
- a response to a lack of facilities in the city in a particular sphere: for example, the building of a large all-purpose stadium in Paris, sports facilities for Berlin, cultural and recreational venues for Shenyang, development of the hotel sector for Seville, etc.;
- the launch of new major urban development areas. As a general rule, the objective is to create lively districts

by mixing different functions, such as the case of Paris (Saint-Denis) or Barcelona (Forum 2004). In other cases one function may predominate, often the placement of hi-tech economic activities, such as Seoul, Seville or Sydney;

- renovation or environmental rehabilitation of rundown or crisis-ridden areas of the city. This is a fairly new tendency: Paris, Sydney or Barcelona conceive their events projects as levers to bring about a change in the living conditions and image of areas which are underprivileged but have a potential for improvement.

### 2.4. SPECIFIC

According to its history, the local context and the nature of the event, each city pursues goals of its own. For example: to involve a group of players in a major project, to exploit the energy generated by an exceptional event to speed up processes and remove obstacles, to affirm a level of political power, to put on a popular event, to encourage innovation in the sphere of sustainable development, etc.

The major sports events usually have one common goal: to promote or boost sport and the values that go with it among the population, as in the cases of Seville and Melbourne.

### 3. WHAT EFFECTS DO THE MAJOR EVENTS HAVE ON THE CITIES?

#### 3.1 IMAGE

##### 3.1.1 International attention

The organisation of a major event broadcast by the international media helps to create, transform or boost the image of a city among both tourists and investors and the people who live in it. The effects of major events on the image of the city are often mentioned in the case studies, though we still lack data for measuring them.

It cannot be denied that the Universal Exhibition in Seville (1992) helped to provide the city and its region (Andalusia) with a modern image; previously they had both been associated with their rich past and heritage. Likewise, the Football World Cup (1998) enabled Paris to rejuvenate and re-energise the image of a capital associated rather with culture and monuments. The Rio Carnival plays a great part in the festive, sensual and generally joyful image associated with the city. Munich shows that the effects can be lasting: thirty years after the Olympic Games in 1972 the city still values that Olympic identity, having laid out a new recreational park called 'Olympic Spirit'.

Nor is it necessary for the city bid to be accepted for its image to be transformed. The unlucky bids of South Africa for the 2004 Olympic Games (Cape Town) and then the 2006 World Cup in the context of the post-apartheid period have helped to change the image of the country and open it up to the world.

But the effects on the image may also be negative. The difficulties in accommodating visitors during the Olympic Games in Atlanta in 1996 and the controversies over the Universal Exhibition in Hanover in 2000 tarnis-

hed the images of both cities and countries, which had been highly reputed for their organisation capacity.

##### 3.1.2 The essential role of the media

Media coverage of the major events is a fundamental element. The host of journalists who attended the international exhibition in Lisbon in 1998 (over 6,300 foreign reporters from 88 countries and 5,200 Portuguese) made a contribution to the prestige of the city and the country, which both lacked international fame.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, the bad relations that were established from the outset between the press and the organisers of the Hanover Universal Exhibition in 2000 did not give the event an attractive image. And the confidentiality of the media coverage outside China for International Amities Event Month (1999) did not enable Shenyang to really make itself known in the world at large, despite the presence of foreign tourists and business people.


We should also point out the influence of the participation of 'star' athletes on the breadth of media coverage and thus on the financial results of the sports events.

##### 3.1.3 Internal image and identity of the city

Moreover, above and beyond the image portrayed all over the world, a major event may have a very important effect on the image the residents themselves have of their city and country. We may say that, in a context of gloom and scepticism, the Football World Cup in 1998 gave the French renewed confidence and brought them all together, regardless of origin or differences. Likewise the Rio Carnival has played an indisputable part in the identity of the Cariocas.

---

1. *The Attractive City, Catalyst for economic development and social revitalisation*, EURICUR, 2000.



The Forum 2004 project, an instrument for creating a new city centre in the Besòs district.

## 3.2 REGIONAL AND URBAN PLANNING

### 3.2.1 A catalyst in large urban development projects

With the exception of the Rio Carnival and the World Youth Days in Toronto in 2002, all the events studied have been conceived as catalysts for large-scale transformations of the city. Some cities, like Barcelona, even admit that the major events are pretexts, the real aim being to improve the global attraction of the city by installing infrastructures, rehabilitating rundown areas and creating new areas for development. And so the major events have structural effects on the long-term organisation of the city, the region and even the country.

The recent examples of Barcelona, Paris Ile-de-France, Seoul or Lisbon show that the major events are particularly useful and effective for launching ambitious town-planning projects which require the concentration of large public investments in time and space.

But that concentration is sometimes seen as excessive and some cities, such as Melbourne or Rome (Jubilee 2000), take advantage of the big project to launch dozens, even hundreds, of more modest ones around it to improve the everyday quality of life of the residents.

### 3.2.2 Speeding up the installation of infrastructures

The effects of the major events are particularly strong in terms of international infrastructures in two areas: transport and the infrastructures linked to the event. They also enable the city to considerably speed up the building of certain facilities which respond to recognised needs: the time gained is often ten or fifteen years of current investment. There is nevertheless a risk of oversizing in relation to real demand.

Transport infrastructures. Some cities, like Barcelona, Seoul, Seville, Sydney or Shenyang, whose ambition is to be recognised on the international scene, have used the events to provide the transport infrastructures they need to reach that position: international airport, motorway networks, high speed railway lines, underground or high output telecommunications networks. Those infrastructures are part of a prospect of improvement to the general accessibility of the city, the region or even the country as a whole. In the cases studied they have to do with a concern with public utilities usually guaranteed by governments (airports, railway links) or cities (public transport).

Among the outstanding examples in this area we might mention the 1992 Olympic Games, which enabled Barcelona to enlarge the airport and build the ring roads in record time; Expo'92 which equipped Andalusia with a motorway network and a high speed train to Madrid; Expo'98, which provided Lisbon with a large new bridge over the Tagus and a new station; and International Amities Event Month, which equipped Shenyang with five new major highway systems.

Special infrastructures for the event. With the exception of the World Youth Days in Toronto, the events studied led to the building of new facilities or the adaptation of existing ones: big stadiums (Seoul, Paris, Berlin), sports complexes (Sydney, Melbourne), congress, exhibition or recreational centres (Barcelona, Shenyang), etc. Often largely financed by the public sector, those facilities had to find some kind of social and/or economic profitability after the event.<sup>2</sup>

The size of the city plays an essential role in the possibilities of later use: it is easier to fill a stadium with a capacity of 65,000 in Seoul (9.9 million inhabitants) than one of 60,000 in Seville (1.2 million inhabitants).

2. See 3.5. Public finances.

Architecture is a powerful image vector  
(the new Oriente Station, Lisbon 1998).



The main tendency in recent years is the concept of big stadiums as all-purpose urban facilities integrated into the city: the Stade de France, for example, has become a venue for culture, entertainment and seminars.

### 3.2.3 The conversion of rundown areas into new districts

A large number of urban projects associated with the events studied are part of a strategy for converting old industrial areas or rundown districts of the city.

That is the case of Paris, with the building of the Stade de France in an industrial zone in decline, Plaine Saint-Denis, around which a new district, dominated by the tertiary sector, is springing up. Sydney chose the Homebush Bay site, occupied by noxious activities, to install the Olympic Park. In Lisbon, the site for Expo'98, the *Oriente* sector, was in an extremely bad state due to the presence of an oil refinery, rubbish tips and a slaughterhouse.

In Barcelona, the site of Forum 2004, currently occupied by a waste disposal plant and an electric power station and cut in two by the ring road, has to be transformed into a new district designed for recreation. And the site chosen by Seoul for the World Cup Stadium and the Millennium City in Sang-am was once occupied by a vast waste treatment centre.

In all cases these are sectors that require substantial public investment at the beginning before the private promoters are willing to take over: compulsory purchase, rehabilitation of sites, restructuring the road system, improving access by public transport, covering motorways, improving the environment, etc.

The major events make it possible to undertake big town-planning projects dealing with large surface areas:

over 1,000 hectares for the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, 350 hectares for Expo'98 in a vast sector in a process of change, 225 hectares for Forum 2004 in Barcelona, 215 hectares for Expo'92 in Seville. About 150 hectares are currently being redeveloped around the Stade de France.

Near Paris, perception of Plaine Saint-Denis has been radically transformed by the World Cup and the development that went with it: from an image of a heavy industrial zone in decline, it is now seen as one of the extensions of the Défense tertiary area. 450,000 square metres of premises (mostly offices) were commercialised in 2000 alone, an exceptional figure for the sector.<sup>3</sup> The proximity of the Stade de France, legendary symbol of 'France the winner', is sought after by companies. Today it is an important international urban marketing element for Paris and the region.

Apart from their scale, the main feature of those local operations at the heart of the cities is the opportunity to carry out diversified programmes around a multimode transport network: offices, housing, businesses, hotels, congress centres, university centres, recreational areas, urban parks, etc. In Lisbon, for example, the implementation of the ambitious programme for the *Expo Urbe* project (about 1,170,000 m<sup>2</sup> of housing, 450,000 m<sup>2</sup> of offices, 150,000 m<sup>2</sup> of businesses and 82,000 m<sup>2</sup> of various programmes) is already well under way. The large metropolitan cultural complex and the shopping centre are the engines of the new district.

The same logic prevails in Barcelona: after the Olympic Games, which led to the construction of 4,500 housing units and 5,000 hotel rooms, Forum 2004 should generate a new city centre, including housing (150,000 m<sup>2</sup>), offices (95,000 m<sup>2</sup>), hotels (100,000 m<sup>2</sup>), university

3. Figures April 2001.

(60,000 m<sup>2</sup>), etc. The project also includes the renovation of a large low-rent housing district located nearby.

These are examples of the new city development areas, whose 'setting up' is directly or indirectly a result of the organisation of a major event.

### 3.3 THE ENVIRONMENT

The negative or positive effects on the environment have not been closely studied by the cities in the survey. However, since the 'ecological' Winter Games in Lillehammer in 1994, sustainable development has tended to take on growing importance among the concerns and strategies of events organisers.

#### 3.3.1 Strategies for reducing potential negative effects

*A priori*, there are many potential negative effects of the organisation of large projects, all the more so when they are implemented with tight schedules. Before the event we can foresee: destruction of natural environments to build infrastructures, large consumption of non-renewable resources (natural or farming areas, underground materials, etc.), damage linked to the transport of materials by road, etc. During the event: heavy consumption of fossil energy for air-conditioning, lighting and transport, generation of large amounts of waste, various kinds of pollution connected with transport (air, noise), etc. After the event: pressure on the natural resources for the maintenance of the facilities (water, energy), evolution of new models of consumption which are less respectful of the environment, etc.

In the face of those risks, the cities try on the one hand to minimise the negative effects and on the other to maximise the possible ecological benefits of the major events.

Minimising the negative effects means holding the event in already built-up areas rather than on natural sites: that is the choice facing cities such as Barcelona, Paris, Shenyang, Toronto or Melbourne. Giving priority to water for transporting materials for the demolition and construction of facilities, as for the building of the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, reduces damage. Using public transport for spectators and participants also helps limit pollution: that was the choice made by France for the World Cup in 1998, when 75% of the spectators came by train or underground, and Sydney for the Olympic Games, when public transport dealt with 80%. The question is to know to what extent those successes have been maintained after the events.

More generally, the Sydney Games enabled the city to raise international requirements in terms of high level environmental care, recycling of materials, waste or water, and to insist on the use of renewable energy for the facilities (for example, the 19 solar panels at the Olympic site produce 160,000 kW). Those requirements have been collected in the form of a notebook for the next Games in 2008: ('Environmental guidelines for the Summer Olympics').

#### 3.3.2 Benefits for the environment

The aim of maximising the benefits for the environment may take quite different forms from one case to another. It may be a matter of environmentally improving rundown sites. Lisbon provides an interesting reference here: Expo'98 (thanks to a large financial contribution from Europe) made it possible to decontaminate the river, modernise the waste treatment system and move a harmful oil refinery, etc. Sydney also made considerable efforts to conserve endangered animal species, to reconstruct natural aquatic environments, to eliminate polluting waste from the bay, to decontaminate polluted soil and lay out 450 hectares of green spaces, for example. Likewise, in Barcelona Forum 2004 has set itself the



© Damien Cheliec - Archipress

goal of improving the degraded environment of the Besòs river along a four-kilometre stretch and to build a large water purification plant.

In a longer-term perspective, the environment will also benefit from technological innovations linked to the major events. Expo 2000 in Hanover, for example, made it possible to experiment with new modes of ecological construction using renewable energies (geothermal, solar) and recyclable materials.

#### 3.4 ECONOMIC AND TOURISTIC DEVELOPMENT

One of the main justifications of the major events is the effect they are supposed to have on the economy in the short, medium and long term. If it is generally possible to estimate the amount of public and private investment for an event, and if one can then assess the number of lasting jobs created in a particular sector of activity, it is far more difficult to measure the indirect and induced effects of the events in terms of the city or the country.

##### 3.4.1 Positive, but limited, macroeconomic effects

The global effect of world events on national economies is notably linked to the total amount of investments, the economic surface of the country and its degree of international openness: with hindsight, we can see that the 1998 Olympic Games in Seoul launched the country on the international scene and improved its position among the 'Asian tigers'.

A similar phenomenon occurred in 1992 with the reintroduction of Spain into the international market after

40 years of relative isolation. We may estimate that the Barcelona Olympic Games injected about \$16.6 m into the Spanish economy over the period 1986-93, representing 2.9% of the GDP of the country (1992).<sup>4</sup> It is estimated that the contribution made by Expo'98 in Lisbon to the GDP of Portugal was between 0.9% and 1.2% in 1998.<sup>5</sup>

One method of assessing the economic impact of the Sydney Games in 2000<sup>6</sup> takes the contribution to the economy of the state of New South Wales to be about \$4.3 m between 1994 and 2006, or 1% of the GDP, in other words 0.15% of the Australian GDP. Those assessments are based on a considerable stimulation of the job market before and during the Games and an improvement in productivity afterwards. Early in 2002, the Central Bank of South Korea forecast that the World Cup should bring a growth of 0.11% to the economy of the country.

We must also relate those effects to the macroeconomic risks involved in the organisation of a major event, notably in the economies of developing countries: inflation, increased labour costs, more imports, etc.<sup>7</sup>

##### 3.4.2 Different economic effects on the city

According to the level of economic development, the cities can profit from the major events either to assert an economic position in the face of competitor cities or to energise their economy or to open up to the world economy. The city of Seoul, for example, does not expect the same economic effects from the World Cup in 2002 as from the Olympic Games in 1988. The fundamental difference is that the two events have come at radically

4. *The Impact of the Olympic Games on Real Estate Markets, 2001.*

5. *The Attractive City, 2000.*

6. *Economic Impact of the Sydney Olympic Games, NSW, 1997.*

7. *China Daily, 16.07.2001.*





The Expo'98 site in Lisbon, originally very rundown, has undergone a metamorphosis.

different stages of development of the city: an emerging economy and national positioning in 1988, a 'postmodern' economy and continental positioning in 2002.

And whatever the scale of the effect, in all the cases studied the major events have been a trigger of economic development for the cities.

First of all, they have often provided an opportunity to mobilise substantial public and private investments. Then, they have induced immediate or longer-term economic effects in many sectors, such as property, employment or tourism.

**Attracting external public and private investment.** The major events are an opportunity to attract exceptional public and private financial contributions from outside the city. So the Spanish government financed 41% of the public expenditure of the Barcelona Olympic Games in 1992, the Catalan government 32%, the public bodies in the metropolitan area (outside the city of Barcelona) 9%. The city council, the main beneficiary of the Games, only financed 18% of the public expenditure.

In the short term, the major events often make it possible to speed up a certain number of public investment decisions and to build infrastructures which are planned but whose financing would have been spread over several years, as in the case of Football World Cup in Saint-Denis in 1998 and the Universal Exhibition in Seville in 1992.

The event often succeeds in involving the private partners, who can take over from the public investors. So the big Spanish banks and a number of large international and Spanish companies 'sponsored' the Universal Exhibition in Seville. Likewise, only 47% of the investment in infrastructures made for the Barcelona Olympic Games was financed from public funds. And the prospect of the Olympic Games linked to the integration of

China into a market economy has attracted the French group Accor which, between now and 2008, will co-manage fifty or so three-star hotels in the country.

And so in the end it seems that the multiplier effect of public and private investments in a major event can be most interesting for a city. Between 1987 and 1992 the multiplier effect of the investments linked to the Olympic Games for the city of Barcelona is estimated at 14 to 1, not differentiating between public and private expenditure.

The successful organisation of a major event creates confidence in the city and favours investment subsequently. We might mention the 138% growth of investment in Shenyang between 1999 and 2000.

A major event can also provide a city in economic difficulties with the means to escape from the crisis: in Saint-Denis the private property promoters, who had been reticent until 1998 to invest in the Plaine Saint-Denis district, have no hesitation in launching projects today.

**Energising the property market in the medium term.** The effects of the major events and the investments linked with them have many repercussions on the local property markets. They can indeed energise the market as in Plaine Saint-Denis, a district which is now enjoying a property boom, or Shenyang, where the number of square metres built increased by 153% between 1999 and 2000 (or 20 points more than an ordinary year, according to the city council).

Moreover, and as the urban development sector has shown, the major events are themselves an opportunity to create new districts as in Barcelona and Seville in 1992. And the implementation of those programmes, often very ambitious and covering facilities, housing and

offices, inevitably has effects on the local property market. We might mention the 237% increase in the number of square metres of office space built in Barcelona between 1989 and 1990 before the Olympic Games.

It is extremely difficult to separate the effects connected with the economic situation from the ones linked to the major events. Moreover, in the cases studied concerning relatively recent events, a critical analysis of the programming and the results of the commercialisation have rarely been included.

However, it seems that the implementation of the big property programmes often pushes up the price of land, as in Seville in 1992. The commercialisation at the time of those big programmes can destructure the whole of the local market. We might mention the difficulties of commercialisation of the technological park on the Cartuja site, built at the time of the Universal Exhibition in Seville, or the offices built at the time of the Barcelona Olympic Games.

**Variable effects on local employment.** The major events induce the creation of a large number of direct or induced, temporary or longer lasting jobs.

Even if they are temporary, the jobs in the construction of the transport and visitor reception infrastructures and the ones linked to the organisation of the event itself are far from negligible. For example, according to different analyses the Barcelona Olympic Games created between 25,000 and 60,000 jobs per year. Another example: the number of direct jobs created by the Universal Exhibition in Seville is estimated at 3,140 per year on average for the period 1985-1993, with a peak of 14,000 in 1992-1993.

Other, longer lasting jobs have a real effect on the local economy even if it has never been calculated in the

cases studied. It is nevertheless undeniable that the increase in the number of tourists and the management over time of the new facilities, hotels, etc. built at the time of the major events induce the creation of lasting jobs. Take the everyday exploitation of the Stade de France, which generates 150 permanent jobs, to which we should add the 1,000 to 1,500 people who are taken on for the big events.

**Very positive effects on tourism.** The effects of the organisation of major events on tourism are considerable, even if they are difficult to quantify.

In the short term, there can be negative effects. Indeed, in the cities which are already tourist destinations, some 'traditional' visitors postpone or cancel their stays as long as the event lasts. Sometimes the city can only record a tiny increase in the number of tourists, as was the case with the World Athletics Championships in 1999 in Seville. Moreover, there is often price inflation, difficult to control, as was the case with the hotels and restaurants in Seville at the time of the Universal Exhibition in 1992.

However, above and beyond certain negative effects, the major events are globally positive for the tourist activity of a city.

First, during the event itself, the profits for the city can be very high. Thus, the 13.5 million tourists who came to the Universal Exhibition spent about \$3.6 billion in Seville. Likewise, a survey carried out in 1999 with 100,000 tourists showed that they had spent \$80 m during the Rio Carnival.

In the long term, in all cases the media coverage of the major events, the increased supply of hotels and the improvement of reception induce a quantitative rise in the number of visitors. Over the last 10 years, the num-



ber of visitors has increased by 80% in Barcelona (30 new hotels were built in the years leading up to the Olympic Games, of which 13 are luxury). Likewise, since International Amities Event Month in 1999, the number of hotel beds in Shenyang has risen by 20%, the occupation rate has gone up 6 points and the number of tourists has increased by 29%.

Sometimes the major events make it possible to attract a different kind of tourist, new categories of visitor, and to conquer new markets for many years. If Paris was already the world number one tourist destination, the Football World Cup brought new nationalities, notably South Americans, and won back segments of the young tourist market.

### 3.5 PUBLIC FINANCES

In all the cases studied, the effects of the major events on public finances are considerable, whether in terms of the city, the region or the country. According to the size of the investments required in infrastructures and the capacity to involve the private sector, public finances are more or less requested.

#### 3.5.1 A general trend: growth of the share of private financing

The general trend is for the private sector to assume an increasingly large part of the costs, which may be repaid by royalties, takings from ticket sales, renting facilities to the organisers or managing the facilities.

Financing by private capital of a substantial part of the organisation and infrastructure expenditure may be a good solution, but it is not without its risks. The suppliers of private funds are very sensitive to the uncertainties of the political and economic context. Their withdrawal may throw out the whole organisation of an

event, as was the case with the World Afro Music Festival which was planned to take place in Abidjan and the rest of the Ivory Coast in 1999.

The global budget for the major events may be broken down into two broad sectors which have a strong impact on public finances:

- the organisation itself: operational expenditure and organisation takings
- the installation and management of the infrastructures and superstructures for the event

#### 3.5.2 Balanced accounts for the organisation often achieved

Quite easy to measure in strictly accounting terms, a balance between organisation expenditure and revenue is achieved in many cases. The organisation of the Football World Cup in France in 1998 even produced a \$41.2 m surplus, which was passed on to the small clubs and the amateur game. The organisation budgets for the events usually vary (\$360 m for France'98, about \$1.6 billion for the Barcelona Olympic Games in 1992). Some are quite small: Shenyang 1999 was only around \$24 m.

The example of the Universal Exhibition in Hanover, however, shows that an overestimate of the number of visitors (18 million instead of the 40 million expected) can create a deficit for the organisation which is difficult to compensate (\$1 billion).

#### 3.5.3 Investment expenditure which is difficult to amortise

If we except the International Amities Event Month organised in Shenyang in 1999, the World Youth Days to be held in 2002 in Toronto and, of course, the rejected bids, investment in the infrastructures and facilities required for the organisation of the events studied makes up the bulk of the costs borne by the public sector, even if they cannot be attributed entirely to the

Thousands of tourists attend the Rio Carnival parade every year (2000).



major events and the corresponding expenditure does not appear in the financial results of the case studies.

The overall investment budget for infrastructures and facilities for France'98 was three times that of the organisation of the event. The infrastructures required for the Barcelona Olympic Games amounted to \$8 billion (five times the organisation budget), \$9.7 billion for the Universal Exhibition in Seville in 1992 and \$246 m just for the renovation of the Olympic Stadium in Berlin. The investments required for the organisation of the 2008 Olympic Games have been estimated at \$24 billion.

The investment and borrowing capacity of the cities also plays a fundamental part. Those capacities vary tremendously from one country or city to another. Each at its own level, cities as different as Abidjan or Seville have difficulties finding the necessary financial guarantees for the organisation of their events projects.

And the debt can be even higher. Even if it only financed 18% of the expenditure connected with the Olympic Games, the debt for the event was 20% of the investment capacity of the city of Barcelona until 2007.

When the event is an initiative of the city, the existence of a city authority with its own funds, like Toronto, enlarges the financial possibilities. That makes it possible to share the risks, the expenditure and the possible profits. Financing which is crossed over several levels of public bodies is a solution currently used by many countries for infrastructure investments.

#### **3.5.4 Major operational costs linked to the reuse of facilities**

Once the event is over, one of the great challenges for the cities is the management over time of the facilities built for the occasion. The financial results of the events studied are established at the end of the event and do

not take into account long term management expenses. It often seems that those facilities, sized according to the event, are oversized for the everyday use which the population of the city may make of them in the long term. And in many cases the underuse of the facilities is a great financial burden for the public finances of the cities, the regions and the countries, even if that burden cannot be put down to the event itself.

Seville has difficulties reusing the facilities built for the World Athletics Championships in 1999. The Olympic Stadium (capacity 60,000) has not yet found a definitive use. The existence of the facility is one of the city's major assets in its bids for the Olympic Games. But in the meantime neither of the two football clubs in the city has chosen to move there and it is used on very few occasions.

Likewise, the Olympic complex built in Seoul for the Olympic Games in 1988 (Jamsil Sport Complex) is underused: the stadium was only used on an average of 75 days a year between 1995 and 1997, the gymnasium 172 and the baseball park 139. It is still not known when the new all-purpose stadium built in Seoul for the Football World Cup in 2002 will begin to turn a profit. Today pessimistic forecasts reckon it will start to pay off in 2020.

We might also mention the advantageous financial conditions offered the management of the Stade de France, which was guaranteed minimum revenue by the government.

The financial or social need for optimal use of the facilities built for the major events encourages their managers to look for a range of uses. The city of Rio has had to face that question. So that the Sambodrome is not used only a few days a year, classrooms and concert halls have been built under the stands. And for them to

be really useful and to belong to the people of the city, the facility was built in a poor district. But that location in a rundown part of the city does not give the event a good image in the eyes of foreign tourists.

### 3.6 THE PEOPLE INVOLVED

The organisation of a major event brings into play quite different kinds of methods and know-how from the ones required for the everyday administration of a city. It needs unprecedented forms of cooperation among the public authorities and between the public authorities and the private sector, which may even change the way of governing the city. Within the institutions, it involves evolution in human resources management to allow individuals to better use the capacities for initiative, autonomy and enthusiasm required for the project. In terms of society in general, the preparation and mounting of an event have energising effects on the residents.

Those direct and indirect effects on both individuals and institutions are by no means negligible *a priori*, but they are difficult to appreciate outside, since the cities in the studies have been rather discreet on this subject. However, the elements collected show that the events bring about sweeping changes in this field which may fade very rapidly.

#### 3.6.1 Effects on ways of governing the city

The need to concentrate all available energy in a very short time calls into question the routine ways of operation. It immediately shows up any possible dysfunction in the behaviour of the city. The temporary solutions dreamt up for the event may in some cases become institutionalised after it.

As an example, the efficiency of transport management during the Olympic Games in Sydney in 2000 has

brought to light the need for the city to have a permanent single transport authority, covering all means (road, bus, rail, ferry, airport links, etc.) and taking charge of decisions, control and communication with the public.

In Barcelona, the Olympic Games also helped to reveal the usefulness of a strategic development approach on the scale not just of the city itself, but of the metropolitan area. That led to a partnership between the major decision makers within the 'Association for the 1999-2005 Strategic Plan'.

In Ile-de-France, however, the modes of informal cooperation introduced during the preparation for the World Cup in 1998 between the government, the region, the cities of Paris and Saint-Denis and a number of public players in town-planning were not continued after the event. The compartmentalisation and vertical ways of functioning were put back in place.

In Shenyang, on the contrary, the relations between the central government and the city were made easier by the common task carried out for the organisation of International Amities Event Month. The effectiveness of the work of the public services was improved. The city considers that a decisive stage has been passed in mutual understanding between the local government and the private sector: the advantages for the private companies of cooperation with the city are seen as a guarantee of their involvement in other projects in the future.

In Seville the determination to confirm the city as a host for world sports events led to the installation of a mixed company, the Sports Promotion Bureau, financed equally by the public and private sectors (Spanish tourist companies).

## Positive repercussions on the population

Except for a few rare cases of a clear failure of the organisation, holding a world event draws broad popular support in the city and enables people to put aside the scepticism and even hostility that may have dogged the bid. The sports competitions and the big national commemorative festivals strengthen the foundations of society.

When a successful organisation and success by the country's players in the competition come together, the effect is maximised. That is what happened in Paris in 1998: the good results followed by the victory of the French team provided the occasion for a big popular festival which brought French people together. Public morale took a leap forward in 1998 which has encouraged an economic recovery all over the country.

In Lisbon in 1998, too, the satisfaction of a successful event stirred a legitimate national pride which has strengthened the Portuguese people's confidence in their organisation capacity. It has produced sequels with the appointment of Oporto as European Cultural Capital for 2001 (with Rotterdam) and the choice of Portugal to host Euro 2004.

Opening up to the world and the feeling of belonging to the international community are also among the highly sensitive direct effects in a city like Shenyang, where the major events receive broad support, in particular among young people.



## 4. BRINGING OFF A MAJOR EVENT: FAVOURABLE FACTORS

The success of an event is tested at a number of stages: a successful preparation brings assets for a successful organisation; and a successful event provides assets for the success of exploitation after the event.

If each event takes place in a different political, cultural, economic and urban context, certain particularly favourable factors have been identified by the cities.

### What are the main risks of major events?

The main risks identified by the cities in the cases studied may be grouped in a number of categories:

#### Financial risks

- organisation deficit (ticket sales, broadcasting) borne by the public bodies
- indebtedness for the city hampering long-term investment
- excessive operation costs of the facilities

#### Risks connected with the organisation

- excessive demands imposed by the international bodies
- haste and insufficiently deep studies which do not allow the organisation to measure all the consequences of the decisions taken
- poor coordination among the people involved
- deficient communication
- problems with reception and flow management (information, accommodation, transport)
- breakdown of computer or communication systems

- risks to public security (terrorism, hooliganism, fraud) and on the roads

#### Risks connected with the scope of the project

- oversizing of facilities and subsequent underuse
- over optimistic forecasts (in terms of visitors, takings, positive effects)
- excessive importance given to the event to the detriment of everyday needs

#### Risks of disturbance of markets

- price inflation during and after the event
- destructuring of the property market, difficulty in commercialising the programmes
- post-event depression

#### Social risks

- opposition to the project by residents
- exclusion of part of the population from the festivities or profits of the event

#### Environmental risks

- natural disaster during the event (earthquake, flood, fire)
- ecological risks

Risk management consists of reckoning with the worst to make sure that it does not happen. According to each situation and the nature of the event, the probability of each risk and its place on a scale of potential seriousness are assessed.

#### 4.1 LONG-TERM VISION AND STRATEGY

The cases studied show that a clear political vision of the future of the city, accompanied by a strategy for making it happen, make the preparation and exploitation of the event easier. If that global vision of economic, social, urban, ecological development is broadly shared, it allows the city to steer a steady course regardless of the hazards of the local or international situation.

At this stage the city must ask itself: 'Is the organisation of a major event a good response to my development goals?'

##### 4.1.1 Defining a strategy

There are different strategies for attaining a position on the national and international scene which may be less risky, less expensive and undoubtedly as effective as the organisation of a single world event.

According to the general development goals they adopt and the legacy they expect of them, the cities can make the choice of developing a policy of organising regular events, more modest in their ambitions and more targeted towards a particular sector. The Rio Carnival comes into this category, as do the great international or world cultural festivals.

Big projects, often conceived around flagship facilities, are effective tools for involving public and private players in achieving a long-term vision. The use of internationally renowned architects heightens the potential media impact of the project. Bilbao has become a reference in this area. Prepared by a long task of strategic analysis (Ria 2000 Project), the building of the Guggenheim Museum has become a highly efficient marketing instrument for the city, an engine for tourism

and for the urban renovation of a conurbation in a deep economic crisis.

More occasional and far less costly, the organisation of a big international exhibition bringing together collections from different sources is subject to fashions and may also become a major media event. The major exhibitions do not require substantial new investment in infrastructures but they bring the tourist economy to life and help with the promotion of the image of the city. And so the exhibition '*Les chefs d'œuvre de la collection Barnes*' organised at the Musée d'Orsay in Paris in 1993, brought 1.4 million visitors, many of them from North America. The theme of the Impressionists created fresh interest in Paris as a tourist destination in that particular market.

Likewise the hosting of important world political forums with strong media coverage does not require large investment and often enables a city to associate its name with historic events. We talk about the Rio Summit (1992 Earth Summit) or the Kyoto Protocol (1997) or the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre (2002).

##### 4.1.2 Integrating the strategy into a global project

If the city opts for an event strategy, the existence of a shared vision gives it the capacity to anticipate and organise to take maximum advantage of all the possible effects of the project, including the ones which a priori may seem unpredictable or secondary.

The city of Barcelona is a reference here: from the outset the bid for the Olympic Games was conceived as a means of obtaining a long-term position as the gateway to Southern Europe. It used the event as a lever to raise its level of facilities and environment to world standards. The city formalised that vision in its first *Barcelona 2000* Strategic Plan, which provided the fra-



© E. Fréje - Adam

mework for the Games project. The third Plan (1999) has integrated the Forum 2004 in an ambition transferred to the scale of the metropolitan region. Other cities have explicitly referred to the Barcelona example: such is the case of Lisbon, whose 1992 Strategic Plan was conceived as an instrument at the service of an ambition to become a great Atlantic European capital.

If the drafting of a strategic document clarifies the rules of the game and makes relations between the players easier, it is not indispensable. The city of Shenyang, for example, through the organisation of cultural (International Folk Dance Festival 1992) or sporting (China 5th Youth Sport Event 1986, Asia Sport Festival 1996) events, is pursuing an explicit strategy of opening up to the world in order to attract foreign capital.

For its part, Toronto has chosen to build its fame on the North American and world scene through events which only require minor investment (G7 Summit in 1988, the Tall Ships Challenge in 1994 or the Special Olympics in 1997) or events which act as engines for the transformation of the city (bid for the Olympic Games in 2008). That is also the case of Seville, which brings credibility to its project to host the Olympic Games by hosting international sports events like the World Athletics Championships.

## 4.2 PREPARATION AND ORGANISATION OF THE EVENT

### 4.2.1 Providing oneself with a strong, readable organisation

Involving the players around a recognised leader. To a great extent, the success of an event rests on involving the players of a city around a leader, who is often the initiator of the event: the city of Barcelona for the 1992 Olympic Games, the city of Shenyang for International Amities Event Month in 1999, the Spanish government

for the Universal Exhibition in 1992 (Expo'92) in Seville, the French government for the 1998 World Cup. The political and media scope and the determination and strength of conviction of the elected political representative at the head of that institution are essential factors for obtaining the necessary financing and smoothing out the obstacles during the preparation phase.

One of the uncertainties lies in the election calendar, since the replacement of the leader in the elections may call certain decisions into question. Because of changes in the government, the location of the future Stade de France suffered many vicissitudes between 1990 and 1994. The search for a broad political consensus at each key stage of the preparation of the event is a means of preventing any backtracking.

In many cases we see the emergence of a double leadership when the authority organising the event and the territorial collective hosting it are different: such was the case of Expo'98 in Lisbon with the close partnership between the government and the city of Lisbon, or the World Cup in 1998 in Ile-de-France (government/ city of Saint-Denis). A convergence of interests between the two parties is indispensable, but it must be formalised by a reciprocal undertaking for the goals pursued and the sharing of roles and resources.

Structuring the participants. The complexity of the organisation of a major event requires a clear definition of the role of each of the players which is known to everybody. The structure set up for the Games in Sydney, decentralised but strongly coordinated, seems to have been highly effective: a national committee (SOCOG) in charge of the general organisation, an authority (OCA) in charge of the construction and exploitation of the sports facilities, an organism (SOBO) in charge of the production of television images, an authority in charge of transport





Berlin has integrated the events into its marketing strategy. Building sites in the city centre in 1999.

(ORTA) and an authority in charge of public security (OSCC). With the exception of the last one, all those organisations were presided by the same elected representative, but they kept a high degree of independence of action until the creation of a central decision making body a few months before the Games, christened Sydney 2000.<sup>9</sup>

#### 4.2.2 Obtaining broad public support

The support of the population and interest groups is a key element in the success of an event. In Western countries public opinion in cities is increasingly sensitive to the use made of public funds and the possible effects of big projects on their environment. The criticisms come from different quarters and are on different levels; in the initiation phase they may have to do with the suitability of the event; in the preparation phase on the financial or town-planning choices, the management of the project, the consequences for the everyday life of the local people, the construction of infrastructures, etc. When they are relayed by the national or international media, they may have a very destabilising effect.

**A critical phase: the bid.** The example of Berlin is interesting here: its bid for the 2000 Olympic Games was weakened by criticisms in the media and the show of opposition by a sector of the population when the IOC members came to visit. The opponents reckoned that a response to the everyday needs of the residents in the eastern part of the city was the priority and many of them feared that the Games would have a negative impact on the environment. Less than ten years later, the Berlin bid to host some matches of the 2006 Football World Cup has been better prepared and more widely accepted.

**Agreement at the project stage.** At the time of the preparation of the 1998 World Cup, the building of the sta-

dium provoked sharp criticism which was passed on by the national press; however, local agreement with the residents and businesses in Saint-Denis in the framework of the regular meetings of the neighbourhood committees and once a year at Plaine grassroots did a great deal to make the building of the facility acceptable, though at the outset it was regarded as noisy. It must be said that the compensations offered to the local residents were substantial, notably thanks to the covering of a very noisy motorway along a one kilometre stretch.

**Use of volunteers at the implementation stage.** The organisation of major events depends on the use of a large number of volunteers: 12,000 for France'98, 34,600 for the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, 47,000 for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The number, their degree of satisfaction and their enthusiasm are indicators of the support of the population. But support can also be expressed through involvement in the preparation of the festive events that accompany the main one: the Saint-Denis Carnivalcade (a costume parade prepared alongside the World Cup) drew 100,000 people.

#### Elements that can encourage the support of the population

- choosing a type of event which is adapted to the local culture. In this respect the popularity of the Rio Carnival is an exceptional case. In Melbourne people have willingly become involved in the organisation of the 2006 Commonwealth Games because of their taste for sport and recreation;

9. Chappelet (Jean-Loup), *Management of the Olympic Games : the lesson of Sydney*.

The Rio Carnival, an event which involves the population (2000).



- creating a dream: the success of major events often has to do with their appeal to the public imagination;
- taking into account the needs of the residents of the city as a whole and the improvement of their everyday living standards: the Jubilee 2000 in Rome gave the whole city a facelift: restoration of monuments, cleaning facades, new cultural venues, new transport lines, rehabilitation of 100 public squares, etc.;
- taking advantage of the event to make significant improvements to the urban environment: that central concern of the organisers of the 'green' Olympic Games in Sydney in 2000 secured the support of the ecological movement;
- involving the population in the project in every possible way: active public debate, participation of the residents in the festivities, involvement of schools, competitions, work with the sports or cultural associations, internet forum, etc.;
- developing a relationship of trust with the media: at the Universal Exhibition in Hanover in 2000, the bad relations between the general organisation bureau and the media had very negative effects.

#### 4.2.3 Manage the preparation time as a rare resource

The dates of a major event are always imperative, and so from the beginning of the project time must be regarded as THE rare resource which needs constant attention.

Involving the public and private players as soon as possible. That is what Sydney did by setting up its

Organising Committee two months after the selection of the bid by the IOC. Melbourne also set up its Committee early, nine years before the opening of the Commonwealth Games in 2006. In parallel the city has launched actions to involve partners and future participants through press conferences and a comprehensive internet site.

**Anticipating and planning.** Preparing an event is first of all imagining a priori all the problems that may arise in a series of areas (security, transport, health, etc.), at every stage (before, during and after the event) and constructing adapted response scenarios. The 1998 World Cup provides an interesting example in the field of security: faced with the risks of hooliganism, an original and highly effective international cooperation system was set up with the participation of foreign police forces in association with the French decision-making centres. Similar devices are set up early on by most governments hosting events to prevent terrorist risks.

Anticipating and planning is also programming the subsequent use of the facilities. In Berlin, for example, most of the sports facilities conceived in 1990 with a view to the Olympic Games in 2000 have been built despite the rejection of the bid, to the satisfaction of the people of the city. In Melbourne, for each facility required for the Commonwealth Games in 2006 technical and financial studies have been drafted to choose the best adapted solution: new building, renovation or temporary installation. Each facility must respond to a demand outside the Games and be integrated into a 30 year city programme (socio-economic effects study).

More generally, anticipating and planning consists of setting up the human and material means required for exploitation after the event from the origin of the project.

Testing the installations well before the event.

Completing the facilities well before the event makes it possible to test them on a real scale and to adapt the security and flow management systems as required. Unlike Atlanta in 1996, all the sports venues except one were ready one year before the Sydney Games. The Stade de France was also finished well before the Cup, leaving the organisers seven months to test the facility and accesses.

Preparation also cuts down the extra costs inevitably generated by applying urgent solutions. When the Stade de France was being built, the discovery of pollution that had passed unnoticed slowed down the works. To catch up on the delay, technical and organisational solutions had to be found: in the end one of the biggest stadiums in the world was built in 31 months.

Providing oneself with rapid reaction resources. Even when the organisation seems well planned, a succession of unforeseen events may throw the mechanism out of joint. That was what happened when, a few days before the Sydney Games, the Olympic bus fleet (3,850 vehicles) suffered a series of serious malfunctions (deficient management of depots, drivers getting lost, complaints by staff about bad accommodation and food, etc.). The existence of a single structured authority, the Olympic Roads and Transport Authority, made it possible to solve the problems in record time (60 hours).

Successful transport. Since the Olympic Games in Atlanta, the matter of transport for participants, organisers, journalists and spectators has become critical. The current tendency, remarkably illustrated by the 1998 World Cup in Paris Saint-Denis and especially by the Olympic Games in Sydney, is to set up coherent transport plans that depend on the use of public transport and a series of convergent measures: restricted parking, restricted road traffic, fast site-airport links, shuttles reserved for participants and organisers, etc.

#### 4.3 EXPLOITATION AFTER THE EVENT

Most cities see the major events from the outset as a catalyst for their economic, social and urban development. But how can they make what is just potential a reality? Some cities seem to have succeeded better than others in exploiting the after event. Might there be some particularly favourable solutions?

##### 4.3.1 Choosing the right location for the event in the city

If we take the perspective of using the event to the maximum as a catalysts for urban and economic development, the location in the city is crucial. There are many possible layouts according to the urban structure and the demands of the event, but they will not all have the same effect. The elements to be taken into account are generally the same as in any major urban project:

- the availability of land and accessibility
- the relation with the centre of the conurbation
- the location in terms of development areas and axes

**The availability of land and accessibility.** Land constraints are closely correlated with accessibility by transport. The minimal demands for surfaces for the facilities vary according to the events: several hundred hectares for the Olympic Games, forty or so for a Universal Exhibition, twenty for a World Cup stadium. But if one wants to provide a favourable environment for exploitation after the event, the potentially changeable areas around the site have to be multiplied by five or ten.

Faced with those needs, two possibilities: either the city has suitable land available in its built up area which is either deserted or underused, or it is obliged to develop a new site on the periphery.

In the first case the constraints are maximal bearing in mind the deadlines: land with divided ownership which



slows down acquisition; rehousing occupants; complex demolition or soil depollution sites, etc. At the time of the Paris bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, for example, the IOC harshly criticised the complicated design for the Olympic Village, whose layout was determined by the determination to maintain certain economic activities on the site. Once the land has been developed, commercialisation is often laborious at the beginning because of investors' lack of trust: they often wait for the event to be held before moving in. But the medium and long-term benefits of a location inside the city are generally equal to the investments, as clearly shown by the example of Barcelona.

In the second case, the more peripheral location generally has the advantage of land with a single owner, easier to acquire and develop. But it requires a great effort in terms of transport infrastructures, as shown by the example of Expo 2000 in Hanover.

**The relation with the centre of the conurbation.** Is a 'central' location ideally more favourable functionally and symbolically? The heart of the city is generally more accessible both for visitors and residents. That is where the monuments that symbolise the cultural identity or economic power of the city and will be seen by millions of television viewers all over the world are concentrated.

That is the choice made by Melbourne, where most of the sites for the Commonwealth Games in 2006 are within a radius of three kilometres from the business centre. That location still involves the risk of paralysing the functioning of the city during the event. That was also the choice of Manchester (United Kingdom) for the Commonwealth Games in 2002: the aim of the Manchester Millennium town-planning project was to bring the residents to the city centre, which had been rebuilt after a bomb attack in 1996.

The choice of a location near enough to the centre to take advantage of its services and image, but far enough

out to enable the development of a new centre often seems favourable in terms of organisation and later exploitation. That was the choice made by Barcelona for Forum 2004: the city is aiming to create a new centre five kilometres from the old one.

A location which can be identified with the representation of the host city (or which establishes a symbolic relation with it) is an asset. For Seville, that was the role played by the Gualdaquivir, which was put on show at the inauguration of Expo'92 with a remarkable *son et lumière*; in Lisbon it was the Tagus, in Melbourne the skyline of the business centre will be the backdrop for the Commonwealth Games.

**The location in terms of development areas and axes.** On this point we can observe two city strategies: the ones that depend on sites which are already developed and recognised by the market and the ones whose ambition is to provide an underprivileged sector with a chance for long-term development.

The first strategy was adopted by Hanover for Expo 2000 and perhaps by Melbourne for 2006. It is less risky, but also less likely to transform the city.

The second, which we can observe in Barcelona, Paris or Lisbon, calls for determination and substantial investments to bring districts in crisis back onto the market. But the main tendencies of the property market in a conurbation are difficult to counter: the choice will often fall on districts which already have a recognised potential. The result will be to avoid the worst off districts of the cities.

#### 4.3.2 Thinking town-planning in terms of afterwards

The care given to urban and architectural quality is no guarantee of the success of new districts linked to



Plaine Saint-Denis,  
near Paris, was transformed by the 1998  
Football World Cup.

major events, but it contributes to the national and international image which will be structured by the media. It also contributes to their smooth running and their attractiveness to visitors, residents and investors. That urban quality depends on certain elements:

- the general concept of the urban project: sizing and diversity;
- the reuse of facilities;
- the quality of the public transport connections;
- the quality of the environment and the architectural image.

The general concept of the urban project: sizing and diversity. The big town-planning projects linked to events are subject to constraints that make them difficult to integrate into the existing city: single purpose and size of the facilities, undertakings required for management of major flows, secure perimeters, functional relations between certain facilities, etc.

**Sizing urban spaces correctly.** A compact concept of the event makes the organisation easier: it simplifies security at the site, cuts down travelling times and provides a strong identification. But it is not always favourable to the integration of the event into the city and the reuse of facilities. Required by the *Bureau international des Expositions*, it is also looked on favourably by the International Olympic Committee (IOC).

But the number of sports disciplines in the Olympic Games makes it impossible to concentrate them all on the same site, and so it is a matter of regrouping the new facilities according to their suitability for future needs and to act as support for the development of the districts. The effects of the event can be spread around from points distributed over the whole city. On that hypothesis, the links between the different areas have to be taken great care of.

In terms of each site, there is a great temptation to oversize the streets, the stations and the buildings according to the flow of people or vehicles which they will have to accommodate during the event. But the risk is to create infrastructures and facilities which are so vast that they will look empty afterwards: the huge size of the *Oriente* Station built for Expo'98 in Lisbon, for example, has been severely criticised in the media.

It is preferable to conceive spaces which can be modulated according to the circumstances, even if more people are needed to run them. In Plaine Saint-Denis, for example, the site of the Stade de France, the streets and junctions are on a city scale, a motorway intersection has even become a square with two-way traffic, which makes the management more 'urban', and efficient.

To ensure a diversity of functions, uses and residents. The organisers of events have a tendency to prefer plans that clearly separate the zones reserved for different activities. But if the idea after the event is to encourage the development of a pleasant, lively district, an over rigorous zoning of uses and functions is to be avoided. The cutting up of Expo'92 in Seville into autonomous functional zones (theme park, technology park, university quarter, hotel area) has not made the conversion of the site any easier. In Lisbon a highly diversified programme (accommodation, offices, shopping centre, hotels, restaurants, yachting harbour, schools, public gardens) has been grafted onto the attractions inherited from Expo'98 (aquarium, theatre, museums).

A social and generational mix, a variety of times (daytime and night-time, weekday and weekend activities) must also be found if the new district is to be integrated into its urban environment.

The reuse of facilities. Reusing the facilities is one of the great challenges of the organisation in terms of

both city activity and financial profitability. We can observe several broad kinds of response to this issue: the building of all-purpose facilities, the use of modular buildings, the adaptation of existing facilities, the use of structures that can be dismantled.

It is from rigorous socio-economic feasibility studies that the best adapted and most economical solutions have been chosen, as in Melbourne. A suitable concept can transform a facility which *a priori* is a source of annoyance, like a football stadium, into an attractive services centre integrated into the city, which is the case of the Stade de France.

**The quality of the public transport connections.** Giving a high priority to public transport in access to the sites for both visitors and participants has become obvious to cities today. The transport network cannot be conceived only for the event; it must also guarantee an optimal service for the developing sectors. As in the case of the Exhibition Park in Hanover, good connections with the main points of the city (airport, port, central station) and its different areas (city centre, business centre, residential areas) must be guaranteed.

But ease of access to the future district depends as much on the management as on the infrastructures: frequency and regularity of public transport, parking regulation systems and main thoroughfares, zone access controls, information systems in real time, etc. Traffic plans that discourage the use of private cars, as in Paris in 1998 or Sydney in 2000, should not be forgotten once the event is over because they provide responses to the everyday running of the cities.

**The quality of the environment and the architectural image.** The quality of the urban and natural environment is taking an increasingly important place in inhabitants' residential choices, property investors' strategies

and attracting visitors. All the cities give great importance to the creation of quality urban spaces in the immediate surroundings of the site(s) of the event. Those policies often involve improving the city centre as in Barcelona, Sydney or Melbourne, more rarely improvements spread all over the city.

Architectural innovation becomes a marketing instrument for the cities. The photographs published in magazines, whether general interest or specialist, and on the internet help to arouse a desire to invest or visit. Some cities, notably the Mediterranean ones (Seville, Barcelona, Lisbon) excel at designing public spaces and remarkable buildings. But that involves running costs (maintenance, watering, air conditioning), which must be anticipated.



## 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The major events undeniably bring many benefits in the short and long term for the cities, which must make maximum profit from them by mobilising their resources optimally and strengthening their organisation capacity.

The major events strengthen globalisation and metropolisation. They also involve risks of inequalities within the city itself, but also on a world scale. Legitimate competition must not exclude cooperation and solidarity.

### 5.1 ORGANISING A MAJOR EVENT: A LUXURY FOR RICH CITIES?

#### 5.1.1 Exacerbated worldwide competition, unequal distribution

With globalisation, culture and sport have become a factor in the economic and media competition which tends to be exacerbated on all levels: world, continent, country. Originally, vying for the event was restricted to capitals recognised internationally and their 'challengers', the cities that aspired to the same status. Today increasingly modest cities are embarking on the adventure with all the risks, mostly financial, involved.

In a civilisation that is providing an increasing amount of leisure, the major events have become a powerful engine of development, a power which is almost comparable to that of the industrialisation of the 19th century. But it is particularly unequal. Indeed, generally speaking, that competition concerns cities in developed countries (North America, Western Europe, Australia, Japan). Recent decades have seen a relative fading out of South America and the emergence of bids from new countries (Korea, China, South Africa, Turkey, Russia), though many of them came to nothing. The developing countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, as well as those in economic transition (Eastern Europe), are not much to be seen today on the world events market.

We may then wonder if, on a world scale, the major events only benefit the cities which already hold all the trump cards, the ones that have the capacity to organise this kind of complex event.

On each continent, the situation is doubtless more varied. In Europe, for example, the last two decades have seen the rise of the cities of the South (Barcelona, Seville, Lisbon, Athens), which until then had remained aside from globalisation. No less strong, the competition in South-East Asia reveals the new power of certain cities (Bangkok, Pusan, Seoul, Beijing) sometimes to the detriment of the Japanese cities. In Africa, where it is usually countries that compete to host continental events, a small one like Mali has been selected for the African Nations Cup.

Among countries, the essential difference is between the ones where the capital concentrates most of the necessary elements to host an event and the ones which have a more balanced distribution of cities which gives the regional ones a better chance. Germany is a good illustration of that second case: the decision of Berlin not to be a candidate for the Olympic Games in 2012 could open up the way for cities such as Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf or Leipzig. Australia has a national selection system of bids from different states.

#### 5.1.2 Difficult conditions to meet for certain cities

The conditions to be met by the cities so that they have a chance that their bid will be accepted by an international body are legion and cover an increasingly broad field: legal security, financial guarantees, political and economic stability, freedom of the press, brand protection, reliable health system, security for people and property, accommodation infrastructures, performance of the transport and telecommunications systems, etc.





When shall we see a major world event in Africa?  
Abidjan, the lagoon front.

© DR

For developing cities, the requirements in terms of health and medical infrastructures and financial guarantee are also particularly discriminating elements. For the small cities in developed countries, meeting the requirements in special infrastructures for the event and top notch accommodation may be difficult to meet insofar as there is a great risk of seeing the facilities underused after the event.

#### 5.1.3 A risk of worsening internal inequalities in the city?

Although the phenomenon is difficult to observe, the major events may aggravate social and spatial inequalities in cities in some ways. Indeed, they lead to the creation of international scale infrastructures and services, designed to attract demanding visitors and investors, which may exclude less privileged populations or areas.

Moreover, the size of the investments mobilised at events of this type leads to decisions that may be taken to the detriment of other, more basic and often more useful urgent requirements.

There is also a risk that the central city will grab all the profits made from the events to the detriment of other cities in the conurbation or region.

### 5.2 STRENGTHENING THE INTERNAL SOLIDARITY OF CITIES

A response to the risk of increased inequalities in the city may take different forms:

- the democratic character of the bid decision and making available to the public all the elements that enable them to assess all the consequences of that decision as citizens, residents and taxpayers;
- association of all the groups in the city or the urban region with the project so as to spread the positive effects over as broad an area as possible;

- choosing to locate the event in particularly abandoned districts of the city and to see it as a trigger for urban, social and economic regeneration;
- strengthening, alongside the project for a major event, structural policies designed to reduce poverty and social exclusion in all aspects (improvement of housing, training for young people, preferential access to jobs linked to the event, improvement of quality of life, etc.).

### 5.3 STRENGTHENING THE CITIES' ORGANISATION CAPACITY

#### 5.3.1 Organisation capacity: an indicator of performance and attractiveness

Cities are judged on their capacity to organise these major events, a capacity that seems to be an indicator of the global efficiency of the city, and thus of its attractiveness for its residents, its visitors and its potential investors. That capacity depends on a number of factors, among them the size of the city, its economic bases, its level of facilities, its capacity to mobilise financial and human resources, etc.

Before embarking on the adventure that is the organisation of a major event, the cities must prove *a priori* that they have that capacity. That is particularly so when the bid for an event has to be submitted to the judgement of an international body which has defined a precise set of requirements, such as the International Olympic Committee, the *Bureau international des Expositions* or the International Federation of Football Associations.

But even when it is a 'local' initiative, like Forum 2004 in Barcelona or International Amities Event Month in Shenyang, the cities (or countries) must prove their organisation capacity if they want to be granted public financing (national or international) and attract private funds.

### 5.3.2 Capitalising on the internal experience acquired

Having previous experience in the organisation of major events is not regarded as an absolute requirement by the international bodies, but it is a weighty asset.

Pursuing a 'rising scale' strategy. Among the cities studied, many have pursued a strategy of a gradual 'rising scale' of events over a period of time: the success of a regional event encourages them to organise an international one. If that event is a success it provides credibility for a bid for a major world event. Toronto, Seville, Paris and Shenyang, on different levels, have all followed that progression which enabled them to take advantage of their newly acquired know-how.

With Forum 2004, Barcelona is going further: it is applying the know-how it accumulated with and after the Olympic Games in 1992 to an entirely new concept of a social and cultural event.

Assessing past events. All too often, once the event is over the organisers are content to settle the balance in accounting terms, leaving each player concerned to draw up his own results sheet. That is what happened with the 1998 World Cup, which has never produced an agreed global assessment report over the country as a whole or in the Ile-de-France region.

The aims and modalities of the assessment must be defined at the outset of the project. Mostly it is a matter of knowing whether one is trying to make an assessment which can influence the course of the project in real time or an assessment *a posteriori*. If the second is chosen, it is first of all necessary to decide, behind the apparent goals, what are the real goals of the different players who will make up the basis of the assessment. The next step is to decide who the assessors will be (any assessment should be plural), the subjects to be assessed

(financial, economic and town-planning effects, etc.), which indicators will be used for the assessment and in relation to what periods of reference. Lastly, the form in which the results will be returned must be defined.

### 5.3.3 Producing a machinery for the organisation of major events

Putting on major events has become a worldwide industry and mobilises sectors with a wide range of competences: finance, management, logistics, communication, urban-planning, etc.

In cities in developed or emerging countries, the tendency is to set up permanent structures which enable them to capitalise on the knowledge with a view to assembling a real local machinery for the organisation of major events. That is the case of Seville, whose Sports Promotion Bureau has been set up as a permanent agency responsible for preparing the city's bid for the Olympic Games. To make that bid credible, the Bureau has become a kind of examiner for sports projects and events submitted by the national federations. The World Cup 2002 Research Centre in Seoul is in charge of advising the city on its organisation strategy and marketing the event.

The permanent nature of this type of structure is indispensable if the know-how is to be accumulated, shared and distributed within the cities themselves. Training systems are often indispensable too.

## 5.4 STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

### 5.4.1 Ensuring experience transfer

The cooperation that needs to be fostered between cities has to do with experience transfer. Candidate cities sending observers for long periods to the cities hosting

events is not enough. The international organisations must be more involved in the sharing and distribution of the know-how required for organising events and managing the associated risks.

For example, the International Olympic Committee, in association with the Sydney Olympic Games Organising Committee, has set up an Olympic experience transfer programme (Transfer of Olympic Knowledge or TOK) designed to make it easier to organise future Games. The programme has led to the distribution in Salt Lake City, Athens and Turin of a hundred practical manuals covering matters concerned with the preparation and hosting of an event, which need to be adapted to each culture and each situation.

There are no doubt similar initiatives for other kinds of events, studies are produced by universities or research centres, such as the World Cup 2002 Research Centre in Seoul, reports by teams of observers have been published, but those documents are scattered and difficult to find, particularly for cities in developing countries whose technical and human resources are limited.

#### **5.4.2 The joint organisation of events**

Organising an event among a number of countries enables them a priori to share out the resources and risks. It could then enable cities whose human and financial resources are insufficient to nevertheless be able to host major events.

However, it must be noted that in reality this solution may complicate the organisation due to different rules and practices in each country and duplication of procedures. In the case of the World Cup in 2002 in Korea and Japan, the need to take a plane, to change country, language and currency between matches will not make the organisers' task any easier.

However, the example of the successful organisation of the Belgium-Netherlands Euro 2000 shows that geographical and cultural proximity, the habit of working together and the governments' determination to iron out problems can lead to a highly satisfactory result for both parties.

#### **5.4.3 Cooperation on each continent**

The speeding up of globalisation has increased the need to consolidate areas of solidarity on continents which are not just economic and political, but also cultural. In order to give each city a chance to organise a profitable major event, coherent and transparent selection systems can be conceived.

Europe provides an interesting example. Each year two European cities are appointed 'European Cultural Capitals'. They receive subsidies from the European Union to stage big events highlighting their heritage, their culture and the new forms of artistic expression. For the period 2005-2019, a new system of appointment by rotation has been adopted and will allow each member state to see one of its cities chosen at regular intervals.

Likewise, in Africa cooperation is organised, as shown by the material assistance supplied to Mali by South Africa and other countries on the occasion of the African Nations Cup in 2002.

#### **5.4.4 Advice to candidate cities: the role of Metropolis?**

The international cooperation networks, such as Metropolis, could play an advisory role for the member cities which are contemplating submitting their bid for a major event. They can help to negotiate with the international bodies, to find funds, to provide the benefit of the experience of their members, etc.

## Bibliography

Berg (Leo van den), Braun (Erik), Meer (Jan van der), *Metropolitan Organising Capacity. Experiences with Organising Major Projects in European Cities*. Euricur - European Institute for Comparative Research, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Ashgate, 1997.

Berg (Leo van den), Meer (Jan van der), Otgaar (Alexander), *The Attractive City. Catalyst for Economic Development and Social Revitalisation*, Euricur, February 2000.

Chappelet (Jean-Loup), *Management of the Olympic Games: the lesson of Sydney*.

*Le management des risques dans les grands événements sportifs*, in *La lettre de l'Économie du Sport*, no. 566.

*Les effets durables de l'éphémère*. Dossier, in *Diagonal*, March-April 1999, no.136.

*Manifestations sportives et tourisme*, Conseil National du Tourisme, France, session 1999.

*Reaching Beyond the Gold. The Impact of the Olympic Games on Real Estate Markets*. Jones Lang LaSalle, Issue 1, 2001.

*Sustainability and Large Sport Events*. 7th European Round Table on Cleaner Production, Lund, Sweden, 2 May 2001.



## PART II

### CASE STUDIES

#### INTRODUCTION

The thoughts of the Commission have drawn on both the answers from the cities to the questionnaire *"The effects of major events"* and written contributions from members of the Commission.

The answers from the cities to the questionnaire have been used in a homogeneous form to make for easier reading. Thus each event has been the subject of a case study which sums up the information gathered under three broad headings:

- Points of reference on the event: characteristics, date, preparation, initiative, management, partners, implementation, programme, total cost;
- context, goals and strategies of the cities;
- assets of the experience studied, difficulties encountered and questions.

Each file begins with a short introduction to the city (general description, development issues, experience).

Whenever possible, the Commission has supplemented the data provided with available documents (press reviews, studies, internet sites, eye-witness accounts). To make it easier to compare the events, the costs have mostly been converted into a common reference: the US dollar (conversion at the time of the event for the ones held before 1998, as of 20.04.2001 for recent events or future events). Nevertheless, those costs are often partial and cover realities and meanings which vary from one country to another.

It must also be borne in mind that the events are far from comparable in all aspects. Each experience is original, unique and non-reproducible.

The eight files presented are:

- Barcelona: 1992 from the Olympic Games to the Universal Forum of Cultures 2004

- Berlin: from the bid for the 2000 Olympic Games to the preparation of the 2006 Football World Cup
- Melbourne: the 2006 Commonwealth Games
- Paris Ile-de-France: 1998 Football World Cup
- Rio: Annual Carnival
- Seville: 1992 Universal Exhibition and 1999 World Athletics Championships
- Shenyang: 1999 International Amities Event Month
- Toronto: 2002 World Youth Days



# BARCELONA: from the 1992 Olympic Games to the Universal Forum of Cultures 2004

For almost 20 years, the economic and urban development of Barcelona has been based to a large extent on organising major world events. Drawing on its experience from the 1992 Olympic Games, the city has embarked on a new concept event devoted to exchanges between peoples, the *Universal Forum of Cultures*, which will take place in 2004. Will it be another success?



## Barcelona

Capital of the autonomous community of Catalonia, Barcelona (1.5 million inhabitants) is the leading industrial city of Spain. In 20 years it has risen to the rank of European metropolis, has been active in the economic and cultural spheres and has opened up to the world. Today it is trying to plan its development in the framework of its metropolitan area, which has 4.3 million inhabitants.

## 1. The 1992 Olympic Games transformed the city

### CHARACTERISTICS

Worldwide multi-sports event, city bid submitted to an international organisation, the International Olympic Committee (IOC).

### DATES

Summer 1992 (16 days)

### PREPARATION

Initiative: 1983

Selection of the bid: 1986

End of building work: May 1992

### INITIATIVE

Mayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall.

### MANAGEMENT

Event: National Olympic Committee

Infrastructures: *Barcelona Holding Olímpic SA* (HOLSA), Spanish limited company including the city of Barcelona, the autonomous community of Catalonia and the Spanish central government.

### PARTNERS

The city of Barcelona, the autonomous community of Catalonia, the Spanish government, private companies

### IMPLEMENTATION

3 construction firms controlled by the city: *Anillo Olímpico de Montjuïc SA* (AOMSA), *Vila Olímpica SA* (VOSA) and *Institut Municipal de Promoció Urbanística* (IMPU)

### TOTAL COST

Approx. US\$9,376m, of which organisation budget: US\$1,635 m (17%) and infrastructure budget: US\$8,012 m (83%).  
City share: 18% of total.

### INVESTMENT PROGRAMME

Olympic Stadium (renovation) and Sports Pavilion.  
Complete motorway ring road (35 km) and other roads (35 km).  
4,500 new housing units (2,500 in Barcelona Olympic Village).  
Two telecommunications towers.  
Airport extension, yacht harbour.  
5,000 new hotel rooms.  
110 hectares of parks and 5 km of new beaches.  
Cultural facilities (museums, etc.).

## CONTEXT

In the early 1980s, in a context of economic crisis (around 20% unemployment), Barcelona's first democratically elected local councils embarked on an ambitious programme of urban development. The city's aim was to catch up with other European metropolises. It was during this period (1986) that Spain entered the European Community.

## GOALS AND STRATEGY

From the outset, Barcelona's strategy was to use the Olympic Games as a lever for town planning and economic development in the city in terms of:

- infrastructures: motorway ring road, sports facilities, cultural and tourist facilities,
- town-planning: renovation of run-down districts,





Barcelona Olympic Stadium.

- employment: direct and induced jobs in building and services, during and after the event,
- image: to make the city known to the world, attracting investors and visitors.

One of the goals was to prove that the Catalan metropolis had the organisational capacity and the dynamism to compete with Madrid and other European metropolises as the capital of southern Europe.

Barcelona did not work on the principle of the Olympics as a money-spinner, but as a way to improve the quality of its infrastructures and encourage the private sector to take over from public investment.

### **STRONG POINTS**

#### **The huge impact of the Games on the development of the metropolis**

The money spent on the Games, which totalled almost US\$10,000 m (the second biggest budget in the history of the Olympics after Tokyo 1964), corresponds to 1.8% of the GDP of Catalonia for 6 years. It was a “shot in the arm” for the city and the region from 1987 to 1992: the Games created between 30,000 and 60,000 jobs per year, according to analysts, and made the city economically more attractive. The multiplier effect of the Olympics on the Catalan economy is estimated at 3:1.

Since the Games, the hotel sector has expanded (5,000 new hotel rooms), tourism has increased enormously (2 million visitors in 1992, 3 million in 1997<sup>1</sup>), and the city has become the leading Mediterranean port for pleasure cruises.

Barcelona is firmly on the map today, with a strong image.

#### **A remarkable urban strategy that has become an international reference**

The urban strategy was to use the Olympic Games as an excuse to thoroughly refurbish the city. From 1979, the city council had launched a policy of reclassification of public places as a device for renewing districts. From 1986, it began a strategy of restructuring the city based on 320 projects and 5 new central areas; the Olympics provided the impetus (Barcelona 2000 Strategic Plan). By choosing 4 sites for the Olympics around the city, they were able to obtain funding for the much-needed ring road. By paying particular attention to architectural and town-planning quality, Barcelona has become an international reference.

#### **A leading role played by the city council**

Barcelona city council succeeded in keeping a leading role in all aspects of the project, so as to take maximum advantage of the event. The council only contributed 18% of the expenditure (the Catalan government 32%, the central government 41% and other public metropolitan authorities 9%), although 39% of the investments were within its territory (25% in the rest of the metropolitan region, 16% in the rest of Catalonia, 20% scattered). The multiplier effect for investments in the city between 1987 and 1992 is estimated at 14:1, public and private funding taken together.

#### **An innovative public-private partnership**

Public funds only financed 47% of investments in infrastructures, but the public sector administered 60% of investments, since a number of operations were carried out by the private sector, but controlled by the public sector: the 4,500 housing units of the Olympic villages (of which 4,100 had already been sold by 1995), hotels, offices and telecommunications network.

1. Number of tourists per year: 1991: 1,727,610; 1993: 2,455,249; 2000: 3,149,002.

The event itself was self-financing through sales of broadcasting rights, tickets and sponsors, primarily.

#### **Mobilisation on a regional scale**

Barcelona city council realised early on that it would be in a stronger position if it worked with other Catalan towns and cities. Thus the autonomous community of Catalonia, and especially other councils within the metropolitan area, hosted a number of Olympic events. Events were therefore held in other towns: Badalona, Banyoles, Granollers, L'Hospitalet, La Seu d'Urgell, Terrassa, Vic, etc.

#### **DIFFICULTIES**

##### **The city debt**

The Olympic Games left the city of Barcelona with a debt estimated at Ptas280 billion (\$2,898 m 1992), shared equally between the council and the central government. The city's investment capacity has been encumbered by about 20 to 23% until 2007. To finance its ambitious projects, it has had to seek funding from the private sector (attracted by the Games) and from other authorities' resources. The maintenance of all the facilities (stadiums, parks, promenades, escalators, etc.) is also a burden on council finances.

##### **"Post-Games depression"**

Like the rest of Spain, Barcelona went through a serious economic recession between 1992 and 1994 because of the overheating of the pre-Games period (1987-91). In the period 1993-99 it also suffered from a noticeable lack of investment from the central and autonomous governments; some projects (the airport and port extensions, the high-speed train line between Madrid and France) have been delayed.

##### **Questionable choices, unforeseen effects**

Road infrastructures made up 42% of the total investment. That choice was made to the detriment of public transport and encouraged the development of industrial estates on the outskirts of the city. The demand for office space before the Games was also overestimated. Over the last 10 years, the city has experienced high inflation in housing prices because it is so attractive: the departure of the working classes is perhaps one of the reasons why the population density of the city has fallen (Barcelona city has lost approximately 150,000 inhabitants over the last few years).

#### **LESSONS**

(Successful) events are very good for the development of big cities, but there is a risk of their becoming "festivalised". The economic attractiveness and marketing of cities can happen without events (cf. Bilbao).

To maximise the positive effects of the events, the following elements are needed:

- a clear urban strategy, formalised in some kind of strategic plan
- consensus between public players (authorities and institutions)
- synergy between the public and private sectors. Investment capacity declines once property operations or other sources of private funding are integrated into the city project, and
- quality metropolitan infrastructures (public transport, airport, environmental infrastructures, etc.) to receive visitors.



Montjuïc esplanade prepared for the 1992 Olympic Games.

## 2 The Universal Forum of Cultures 2004: a new concept event

### CHARACTERISTICS

A new concept, local initiative cultural event, backed by an international organisation (UNESCO).

### DATES

23 April to 24 September 2004 (5 months).

### PREPARATION

First idea: October 1996.

Constitution of the Forum Council: 1998.

Approval of the definitive project: December 2000.

### INITIATIVE

Mayor of Barcelona.

### MANAGEMENT

*Forum Universal de las Culturas – Barcelona 2004* public consortium, including the state (the Spanish government), the Generalitat de Catalunya (the Catalan government) and Barcelona city council (the municipal government) [copied from the 1992 Olympic Games].

### PARTNERS

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is the main non-funding partner; private sponsors.

### ORGANISATION

The Universal Forum of Cultures Organising Committee (30 people have been working since 1997).

### IMPLEMENTATION

Private limited company, *Fórum Universal de las Culturas – Barcelona 2004, SA*.

### TOTAL COST

Cost of organising the event estimated at € 306.52 m (Pts51,500 m), of which the cost of outfitting and building the Forum site is estimated at € 195.32 m (Pts32,500 m), and contribution from the institutions at € 114.01 m. (Pts195,000 m).

Investment in infrastructures connected with the Forum funded by public and private promoters estimated at € 1171.95 m.

### CONTEXT

The initiative for the event was taken in very favourable economic (development of the new economy) and political (stability) conditions. Barcelona city council has undertaken to implement some very ambitious projects, so as to be even more competitive, in the South Llobregat area (airport extension, intermodal centre built around the future high-speed train, enlargement of the port) and the North Besòs area (extension of Diagonal Avenue to the seafront, new congress buildings, cleaning the river, etc.).

### STRATEGY

Barcelona is pursuing a multiple strategy through the organisation of an event of this kind: a better international image, a competitive position vis-à-vis the capital, Madrid, and other European cities (Milan, Berlin, etc.), town-planning and economic strategy.


#### An international image strategy

With this event, Barcelona is breaking with the tradition of other major international events such as the Universal Exhibitions or the Olympic Games, which are based on sporting, economic or technical competition between nations. Barcelona intends to invent a new kind of international cultural event based on peace, solidarity between peoples, exchange and the cultural diversity of the world (UNESCO's support lends the project a certain credibility).

#### A national position strategy

Barcelona needs to strengthen its position in relation to other cities and to attract more investment (state and private).

Le projet urban Forum 2004.



#### **A town-planning strategy**

Organising this event gives Barcelona the opportunity to continue its ambitious project to open the city up to the sea, which began with the Olympic Games. The major works in progress will then be justified. The main aim is to renovate and plan a very rundown district at the mouth of the Besòs river, between Barcelona and Sant Adrià de Besòs, and to rehabilitate the neighbouring areas of La Mina and La Catalana. This is the area where most of the Forum activities are to be held.

#### **An economic strategy**

This event, and the urban developments linked with it, should encourage economic development, particularly by launching a new business area designed for new economy activities. The Distrito22@ project will transform about 110 hectares designed for "traditional industries" in a new production zone which can also accommodate economic activities linked to the new forms of production. It will also enable the development of economic activities linked to the new information technologies.

Forum 2004 should also encourage the development of the tourist sector.

#### **STRONG POINTS**

##### **A new concept event**

In the wake of the success of the 1992 Olympic Games, Barcelona can claim to be a dynamic, modern, supportive city. By being in on the start of a new type of event based on debates, conferences, summit meetings of inter-governmental organisations, exhibitions and festivals, it is taking up the various current debates and criticisms of globalisation, and reaping the benefits of events such as Seattle, the Davos Forum or Porto Alegre.

With this in mind, three themes have been selected: cultural diversity, sustainable development and the conditions for peace. Positioned like this, Barcelona can hope that in the future it will be at the centre of a network of metropolises and associations working for culture, peace and exchange between peoples.

##### **An ambitious urban project**

One of the main features of this event is the number of venues and facilities that will be built or modernised, mainly in the Besòs district, where a new centre will be created when the Forum is built: the Barcelona International Congress Centre (conferences and exhibitions).

The plan includes the building of hotels, a shopping centre, offices, a new university campus (university and installations linked to the new technologies), between 900 and 1,200 new housing units, major leisure facilities (zoo, sea zoo, a "water world" with beaches, pools and solariums, a marina and water sports centre, etc.) The sewage plants, waste incinerators and the whole of the energy sector will be transformed and modernised, and the public transport network will be extended.

All of that requires major investments from the public sector (the improvements to be carried out on the Besòs coastal sector on an area of 234 hectares requires a public and private investment of more than Pts195,000 m).

##### **The recognised experience of the 1992 Olympic Games**

One of Barcelona's undeniable assets is its success in organising the Olympic Games. On that occasion, it showed the whole world that it could organise a major international event, and now has a big vote of confidence. The city wants

to use that experience to organise and manage the Forum (creation of the same kinds of organisations and structures), but also to implement its urban development plan, which is a continuation of the Olympic Games one.

## **RISKS AND QUESTIONS**

### **Uncertainties**

Since this is an event of a new kind, many questions remain, notably its capacity to engage the interest of the international media and hence the potential visitors.

The building of a new centre is a challenge, even if major efforts are to be made in terms of transport services.

### **The support of all the local residents**

Moreover, part of the city population may well feel excluded from the choice of investments, which will be concentrated in this particular district, quite possibly at the expense of their more everyday needs. The risk for the project, therefore, is that it will fail to obtain the support of residents and associations as a whole.

### **The association of other authorities**

Moreover, the dossier submitted to the Commission gives no indication of the role played by authorities which are not members of the Consortium, such as the city community, the other local councils, etc., so there is a real question as to their support and the way in which they will mobilise.

## BERLIN: from the bid for the 2000 Olympic Games to the preparation of the 2006 Football World Cup

The new capital of the reunified Germany, Berlin has included major sports events in its marketing strategy. Its purpose is to join the network of international metropolises by demonstrating its organisation capacity. Berlin is busy preparing to host the 2006 Football World Cup. Drawing the lessons from the failure of its bid for the 2000 Olympic Games, it is now considering submitting another bid for 2012.



### Berlin

Both a city and a state, Berlin (3.4 million inhabitants, 4.3 million altogether in Greater Berlin) has become the political and administrative capital of the German Federal Republic. For 10 years it has been undergoing a profound transformation, whose aim is to wipe out the traces of its past division and to play a full role in Germany and in Europe. The city has an efficient transport network and a rich cultural life.

## 1. The bid for the 2000 Olympic Games: a project that came too soon?

### CHARACTERISTICS

Bid turned down by an international body, the International Olympic Committee (IOC).

### DATES

22 July - 6 August 2000 (16 days).

### PREPARATION

October 1989 - October 1993.

### INITIATIVE

Berlin Land.

### MANAGEMENT

Berlin 2000 *Olympia GmbH*, a limited company directed by a Supervising Council, aided by a Sponsorship Committee, and advised by a Parliamentary Consultative Council.

### IMPLEMENTATION (ESTIMATED)

*Sport Site Construction GmbH* (construction company specialising in sports facilities) and *Marketing GmbH*.

### PARTNERS

The federal government and private bodies.

### TOTAL COST (ESTIMATED)

Estimated expenditure: US\$2,000 m.

Estimated revenue: US\$2,116 m.

Expected profit: US\$116 m.

### CONTEXT

Berlin's bid for the 2000 Olympic Games was launched between the fall of the wall (October 1989) and the reunification of the city (October 1990). The main concern of the authorities at the time was to transfer the seat of the federal parliament and government to Berlin and to catch up on the development of the eastern part of the city.

### GOALS AND STRATEGY

Berlin based its bid on a unique situation: a reunited city and a new and old capital for Germany. Hosting the Olympic Games was seen as a device that would reshape the city and stimulate the joint development of both halves. Berlin wanted to show the world that it was a vibrant, modern, international city.

The chosen strategy was to host the Olympic Games in the heart of the city itself, and depend mainly on the public transport network. The assets emphasised were: a green city, a cultural city, a cosmopolitan city, a city that loves sport and a well-equipped city (transport, accommodation).

The main goals of the bid were:

- to receive 3.5 to 4 million visitors, 50% of them foreign,



BerlinOlympic Stadium.

- urban development, improving the transport system and creating new housing areas,
- building new sports facilities (swimming pool, boxing stadium, velodrome), and modernising existing ones to meet the needs of the residents after the Olympics.

## **STRONG POINTS**

### **Making the most of exceptional circumstances**

After several decades of division of the city and the country, the exceptional circumstances of the city's bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games encouraged a consensus between the senate in Berlin and the federal government. Their common goal was to give Germany a political and cultural capital worthy of its economic importance. The bid for the Olympics added impetus to the investments necessary to transfer the seat of the German government and parliament to Berlin. The risks involved in preparing three simultaneous projects (reunifying the city, transferring the capital and hosting the Olympic Games) had been calculated.

### **A well-thought-out town-planning project**

The preparation of the Olympic Games was part of a wider urban development strategy, which gave rise to the approval of the Urban Development Master Plan for Berlin in 1994. The two new housing districts that were provided for in the Olympic Games plan (*Eldenaer Stasse* and *Rummelsburger Bucht*) had already been earmarked for development. Long-term finance plans were drawn up, and town-planning agencies were created to implement them.

The quality of the transport network and the concentration of the venues (19 of the 25 sports inside the city) were noted as strong points by the IOC Commission.

### **Interest from private partners**

At the time of the bid, revenue from private sponsorship of the Olympic Games (a German tradition) was estimated at nearly US\$332 m, approximately 16% of the total expenditure. Some of the major companies were: ABB (electronics), Bertelsmann/Springer (media), Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bundesbahn (transport), Daimler-Benz, Lufthansa, Philips/Siemens, Ruhrgas (energy), Telekom, Volkswagen, Xerox, etc.

### **A favourable impact on the city facilities**

About 70% of the facilities to be built or improved for the Olympic Games were regarded as essential to the city's needs in 1990: many of them have been completed since then, in spite of the failure of the bid (boxing stadium, velodrome, water sports centre) and are in use today by the general public and sports clubs, especially in the eastern part of Berlin.

## **DIFFICULTIES**

### **Critical public opinion**

A sector of the population of Berlin criticised the bid for the 2000 Olympic Games and there was a demonstration by 10 to 15,000 people during the IOC Commission visit. They favoured a more bottom up approach (consultation), beginning by concentrating more on the needs of the inhabitants. Many of them feared that the Games would have a negative impact on the environment. There is no doubt that the bid came too early; the Berliners needed time to accept the transformations of their city into a metropolis and capital.

#### Difficulties in reaching general agreement

When the bid was submitted, agreement had still not been reached on how to share the funding and broadcasting rights between the federal government, the Berlin Land and the sponsors.

#### Problems in reusing sites and facilities

Some of the sports facilities that were built are still not used to their full capacity today.

#### LESSONS

In general terms, and despite the failure of the bid for the Olympic Games, the city has confirmed its interest in undertaking the organisation of a major event, notably in terms of:

- improvement of its international image,
- speeding up the implementation of equitable development projects in the city,
- commercialising new sites for urban development,
- reducing infrastructure deficits, especially in the eastern part of the city.

Those are the reasons why Berlin is submitting its bid for the 2006 Football World Cup and is considering bidding for the 2012 Olympic Games.

However, the city is aware of a number of risks involved in organising a major event, in particular:

- spending time and money with no guarantee of the success of the bid,
- the possibility of financial failure in spite of market studies,
- an overoptimistic estimate of the number of (paying) visitors,
- difficulty in getting support from private companies,
- possible opposition from the residents, which turned out to be one of the major difficulties encountered during the bid for the 2000 Olympic Games,
- the political changes that can influence the evolution of the project.

## 2. The 2006 Football World Cup. A challenge: the renovation of the Olympic Stadium

#### CHARACTERISTICS

Event at the project stage, national bid selected by an international body, the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA).

#### TYPE

World scale sporting event.

#### DATES

Summer 2006 (about 1 month).

#### PREPARATION

2000- 2006 (7 years).

#### INITIATIVE

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

#### MANAGEMENT

Mayor of Berlin and services (for the part concerning Berlin).

#### PARTNERS

Federal government and private partners.

#### TOTAL COST

Budget under study.



## **CONTEXT**

The bid of Berlin to host the World Cup final in 2006 is part of a desire to fulfil its role as the new political and cultural capital of the Federal Republic of Germany.

## **GOALS AND STRATEGY**

In the summer of 2000, the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) decided to accept Berlin's bid in preference to South Africa, but the organisation structure has not yet been set up. It is still too soon to list the measures that will be taken or to try to foresee the impact. Thinking to date in Berlin has concentrated on renovating the Olympic Stadium. No decision has yet been taken about the International Media Centre.

Several assets have been highlighted in Berlin's bid:

- its sporting history and the presence of the Olympic stadium,
- the international character of the city: the inhabitants come from 180 different countries; there are 6 international press agencies and 160 people working for international media,
- excellent transport links with the rest of the world (3 international airports) and within the city (public transport network),
- accommodation capacity (450 hotels).

The number of visitors for the whole of Germany is estimated at between 2.6 and 3.1 million, of whom 840,000 to 1 million will be foreign visitors. The figures are not yet known for Berlin.

## **A CHALLENGE: RENOVATING THE OLYMPIC STADIUM**

Renovating the stadium and, on a wider scale, town-planning for the area around it are major issues for the city. The Olympic Stadium is a classified building built in 1936 in the inner suburbs in Charlottenburg, about 10 kilometres from the city centre, with good underground and train services. Roofing the building will give it a new identity. With 76,000 places, it is one of the biggest stadiums in Germany, but the capacity must be reduced to 67,000 places for the World Cup by 2004. After the event, it is due to become a multipurpose stadium for football, athletics and major cultural events. The cost of the renovation, estimated at DM539 m (US\$246 m), will be met by the city with a contribution of DM100 m from the federal government.

# MELBOURNE, the 2006 Commonwealth Games

The Australian cities are in search of international fame. In the major sports events they have found a kind that are suitable for their culture and organisation capacity. By allowing seven years for optimum preparation of the 2006 Commonwealth Games, the State of Victoria and the city of Melbourne seem to have accumulated a large number of advantages to guarantee success.



## Melbourne

On the coast in south-western Australia, Melbourne is the capital of the State of Victoria and the second largest city in the country (3.3 million inhabitants). It is now spreading along the coast and towards the hinterland with a radius of 30 kilometres from its *Central Business District (CBD)*. To cover travel requirements, it has a network of 36 tramlines and 17 railway lines and is also developing its road network. The services sector is playing an increasingly important part in providing employment for a very cosmopolitan population (110 nationalities).

### CHARACTERISTICS

Sports event project (16 sports, 25 disciplines)  
City bid selected by an international organisation (*Commonwealth Games Federation*), representing 72 countries

### DATES

15 - 26 March 2006 (11 days).

### PREPARATION

National selection: December 1996.  
Organising committee formed: February 1997.  
Selection: 10 October 1999.  
Preparation, construction and assessment: 1 January 2000 - 30 June 2007.

### INITIATIVE

Government of the State of Victoria (*Victorian Major Events Company*).

### MANAGEMENT

*Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games Pty- Ltd.* (organising committee with the status of limited company).

### PARTNERS

State of Victoria, city of Melbourne, Commonwealth Games Federation, Australian Federal Government, Australian Commonwealth Games Association, private sponsors.

### TOTAL COST

Organisation budget approx. \$Aus650 m (US\$335 m 01.04.2001).  
Infrastructures budget approx. \$Aus100 m (US\$516 m).  
Breakdown: public 70% / private 30%.  
Economic impact in the state estimated at +\$Aus372.6 m (US\$192 m).  
Impact on GDP estimated at +\$Aus497 m (US\$256 m).

## CONTEXT

The economic context was particularly favourable at the time of the bid. The government of the State of Victoria at the time had an events policy that was widely appreciated and apparently the subject of broad agreement.

## GOALS

The State of Victoria's goals are:

- to promote Melbourne as a lively, international city,
- to attract potential investors,
- to promote sport,
- to foster urban ecology (recycling waste, innovative building techniques, encouraging the use of public transport).

The goals for the event are 50,000 visitors from within Australia and 15,000 from abroad. The estimated number of people taking part is 15,000: 4,500 athletes, 3,700 team officials, 3,000 VIPs and 3,100 media workers. The event will be prepared and managed by 400 organisers, assisted by 5,000 civil servants and 15,000 volunteers.

The people in charge of the Melbourne 2006 project have designed a strategy in various stages:

- Stage 0: Bid [October 1996 - December 1999]
- Stage 1: Set up [1 January 2000-1 June 2002]
- Stage 2: Build [1 July 2002-1 June 2004]
- Stage 3: Delivery [1 July 2004-1 June 2006]
- Stage 4: Wind up [1 July 2006-30 June 2007]



The Melbourne. The Yarra river.

© laurif - L. Perrin

The bid stage consisted of carrying out feasibility studies and assessing needs for facilities, defining a sports events preliminary programme and estimating budgets. Once the bid had been accepted in the country, the presentation of the project and the sites to the delegates of each Commonwealth country was a crucial moment. After the selection of the bid and the setting up of the organising committee, attention focused on pre-operation studies and the definition of the sports programme (July 2001). The next stage is to monitor the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester (United Kingdom).

Advantages highlighted:

- sites that are concentrated and very close to the city centre,
- commitment to build 4 new facilities which will be part of the urban project (Yarra Plan),
- clean, safe urban environment, outstanding public transport system,
- recognised organisational capacity,
- strong support from the government, the private sector and the population, who are very well disposed towards sports and sport events.

## **STRONG POINTS**

### **In-depth preliminary studies**

Technical, economic and funding studies are carried out for each facility needed for the Games to choose the most appropriate solution: building a new facility, renovating an existing one, or installing a temporary structure.

Each facility has to respond to a demand apart from the Games, which generally means that it has to be multipurpose and integrated into a long-term town-planning programme (socio-economic impact study). Feasibility studies take long-term interest (30 years) into account: beyond that limit, facilities have to be self-funding.

### **A clear strategy, a recognised organisational capacity**

The State of Victoria's capacity to organise major events has been demonstrated with exceptional events (1956 Olympic Games) or regular ones (Australian Formula 1 Grand Prix, National Football Championship, Australian Open Tennis Championship, etc.). The impact of each event has been carefully assessed.

The strategy for the 2006 Commonwealth Games project has been thought through in detail, with a logical sequence of stages and in-depth risk assessment.

### **Favourable conditions**

The organisation of an outdoor sporting event is particularly well-suited to the culture of the country and the characteristics of the city:

- the site, the sea and the countryside, the climate (in summer),
- the residents' enthusiasm for sport, both as spectators and players, and their openness to the outside world, the feeling of belonging to the Commonwealth,
- the experience Melbourne has accrued in crowd and traffic management at previous events. The travel management plan to be drafted will take account of the measures adopted at the Sydney Olympic Games.

#### **A location which makes the Games part of an ambitious town plan**

Materially, the Games will be taking place in a city that already has a wide range of high quality sports facilities: *Melbourne Cricket Ground* (modular stadium with a capacity of 98,000), *Melbourne Park* (tennis stadium with centre court with 16,000 seats), *Colonial Stadium* (renovated stadium with a capacity of 52,000), *Olympic Park* (football, rugby, athletics stadium), *Melbourne Sport and Aquatic Center* (water sports stadium), among others.

The concentration of 70% of the events in a single central sector, the *Games Precinct*, along the banks of the Yarra River, with good connections and a wide range of facilities (hotels, stadiums, parks, exhibition centre, cultural facilities) is outstanding. The Yarra Plan, designed to provide the guidelines for the redevelopment of this central area, includes 40 town-planning projects tending towards improvement of the quality of the environment: improvement of relations between the sites, the river and the business centre, elimination of a road bridge, creation of footbridges and new pedestrian links, etc.

#### **QUESTIONS**

##### **Breakdown of responsibilities among the players**

The State of Victoria is organising the management of the event, with national and international partners from the Commonwealth Games (CGF and ACGA). But how are roles shared between the State of Victoria, Greater Melbourne, the federal government and the private sector? What is the key to the sharing of infrastructure investments? What will the effects of private funding on the later management of the facilities be?

##### **Who are the Games for?**

The success of the event depends mainly on the support of the local population. A cultural festival will be held alongside the Games to ensure "broad participation by the people of Melbourne". Is that participation compatible with the demands of flow management, which will mean encouraging them to "take a holiday" during the event?

#### **LESSONS**

In general terms, the State of Victoria considers that major sports events are good for the development of metropolises:

- they improve the quality of life and give the residents confidence,
- they stimulate the economy and "sell" the city on other markets,
- they provide models for the younger generation and give a boost to sport.

But they also involve risks, notably:

- for public funds: expenditure is short-term, but revenue is in the distant future,
- uncertainties about the participation of "star" athletes, who influence the financial result of the event,
- other unknowns: the weather, a change of government, a change of context for security, evolution of the rules of the event,
- the importance given to preparing the event to the detriment of everyday life.

# PARIS ILE-DE-FRANCE: the 1998 Football World Cup

The Football World Cup organised in France in 1998 has been unanimously acknowledged as a success, in spite of the delays in getting the project off the ground. The event brought the French together, and provided the country and its capital with a new image. In Ile-de-France (the Paris region), the city of Saint-Denis has used the building of the Stade de France as a lever for the economic and urban reform of a rundown sector.



## Paris

A world-class city, Paris is at the centre of an urban conurbation of about 10 million inhabitants, which is part of the Ile-de-France region.

The capital-region has been deeply marked by a history linked to central power and has an outstanding cultural heritage. It is the world's number one tourist destination and a centre for congresses and trade fairs. The transport system is highly efficient.

The Ile-de-France has a diversified economy, marked by its national and international functions, but there are also great social and territorial disparities.

Paris, which has been shaped by the organisation of the first Universal Exhibitions (1855, 1867, 1878, 1889, 1900) and the Olympic Games (1924), had not organised any major event in the decades leading up to the 1998 World Cup, except for the bicentenary of the French Revolution in 1989.

### CHARACTERISTICS

Event run by and selected by an international organisation, the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA), multisite event (10 host cities including Paris and Saint-Denis in Ile-de-France).

### DATES

10 June - 12 July 1998 (64 matches in 33 days).

### PREPARATION

November 1988 (announced), July 1992 (selection by FIFA), October 1993 (site chosen for the Stade de France), spring 1998 (fine tuning).

### INITIATIVE

French government.

### MANAGEMENT

Comité Français d'Organisation (CFO) for organising and marketing the World Cup, Délégation interministérielle à l'organisation de la Coupe du Monde (DICOM) for coordinating the actions of the state.

### IMPLEMENTATION

SANEM Stade de France (a semi-public company) for controlling the building and operation of the Stade de France and the marketing of the surrounding area), Consortium Stade de France (for the design, building and cession of the Stadium), Direction Départementale de l'Équipement (DDE, for installing the infrastructures).

### PARTNERS

City of Paris, city of Saint-Denis, Ile-de-France region, Seine-Saint-Denis department, Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF), Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP) and private firms.

### TOTAL COST

Estimated expenditure for the whole of France: about FF10,000 m (US\$1,335 m 20.04.2001), including FF2,500 m (US\$333 m) for organisation and FF6,900 m (US\$921 m) for investment. In Ile-de-France, investment for the stadiums (Parc des Princes and Stade de France) and the transport infrastructures was estimated at FF5,700 m (US\$761 m), including FF2,550 m (US\$340 m) for the Stade de France alone. Expected profit: US\$116 m.

## CONTEXT

The initiative behind France's bid to host the 1998 Football World Cup was taken by Jacques Chirac, who was then both Prime Minister and mayor of Paris. Launched at a time of economic optimism (1987-91), the idea was soon to come up against financial constraints (1991-97). In 1988, the World Cup was held at the beginning of a new period of growth. The political context had also evolved, with power swinging between several right-wing (1986-88, 1993-95 and 1995-97) and left-wing governments (1988-1993 and 1997 to now), between two French presidents, and between two mayors of Paris.

## GOALS AND STRATEGY


The action taken by the State was initially guided by two main objectives:

- to boost France's image in the world by organising a popular sporting event,
- to build the large stadium of national interest the capital needed to organise major international events.

As the project progressed, two other objectives were brought into the foreground:

- to provide a good reception for the visitors and to reap the tourist benefits,
- to make the event a "time of festivity, solidarity, and citizenship" for all French people.

Paris is trying to modernise its image.  
La Défense business district.



© laurif - C. Abon 1989

The two cities hosting the World Cup in Ile-de-France, namely Paris and Saint-Denis, had complementary goals:

- Paris is trying to modernise its image. La Défense business district.
- Saint-Denis wanted to use the World Cup and the Stade de France as a lever for economic and urban development.

### **STRONG POINTS**

#### **A highly successful organisation**

The 1998 World Cup in France is unanimously considered to have been a highly successful event. This success was due in particular to the organisation:

- the stadiums and the associated facilities were finished on time, most of them being ready several months before the World Cup for “full-scale” test events,
- spectators were received (accommodation, information) satisfactorily,
- the movement of millions of spectators, press and teams between the different venues for the matches went well,
- security was carefully prepared before the event, which considerably limited incidents,
- the event received wide coverage throughout the world, and the Comité Français d’Organisation made a profit from ticket sales (FFr285 m were paid over to the French football clubs).

#### **A new image for France**

The World Cup reinforced the positive image of France, which became one of *“a dynamic, welcoming country which can be trusted and is a winner.”*

#### **Major impact on regional and local development**

The 1998 World Cup factor benefited the entire country, but it was in Ile-de-France that its effect was most marked: in Paris, of course, in terms of image, but also and above all in Saint-Denis (a rather underprivileged town located north of Paris):

- in the Stade de France, the capital-region today has a very high quality all-purpose facility whose modular capacity (18,000 to 95,000) can be adapted for sporting (football, rugby, athletics, etc.) or cultural (concerts, shows, conferences, etc.) events. This flagship facility enjoys a positive image in France and in Europe,
- the building of the Stadium in Plaine Saint-Denis speeded up the installation of infrastructures that were planned but would otherwise have been financed over a period of several years or even several decades (public transport, roads, public areas, etc.),
- these facilities made it possible to launch a regional development priority sector: today, there is a property development boom, with over 685,000 m<sup>2</sup> of office space, shops, and housing planned, including 350,000 m<sup>2</sup> for 2001-2003,
- the image of Plaine Saint-Denis has been radically transformed by the World Cup: it is no longer seen as a declining industrial zone, but rather as an extension to the tertiary hub of La Défense,
- a local authority, the city of Saint-Denis, managed to take full advantage of the event by negotiating with its partners (state, region) conditions favourable to the development of its territory: commitments to offer work for local firms during the construction of the Stadium, creation of long-term jobs for young people, repairing the damage done by an urban motorway being built through it in the 60s, limiting the noise and inconvenience caused by the Stadium, etc.

#### **A positive effect on the tourist figures in Ile-de-France**

The 1998 tourist season was good, and visitors who came to attend the World Cup offset the losses from tourists postponing their visits.

- Ile-de-France received 4.3 million visits, including 2.8 million from foreigners (i.e. 65% of the total) in June and July 1998 in recognised hotel accommodation. The number of nights spent in hotels was up by 4% on the figures for June 1997,
- the World Cup brought tourists from new parts of the world (South America, Japan, South Africa and Singapore), attracted new categories of customers (young people), and “modernised” the image of the capital-region.

#### **A time of festivities and national solidarity that reinforces the image of France**

The side-shows accompanying the main event (performances, processions, etc.) and above all the success of the French football team transformed the World Cup into a major popular festival that united French people from all origins. It also changed French people's relationships with football; the 1998 World Cup is still a reference for young people from underprivileged neighbourhoods. Naturally, this effect was not predictable.

#### **An experience which has enabled Paris to bid for the Olympic Games**

The “snowball effect” set off by the success of the World Cup has enabled Paris to present a serious bid for the 2008 Olympic Games in association with the government and the region.

### **DIFFICULTIES**

#### **Precious time was lost at the start of the project**

The impact of the World Cup could have been more favourable and certain mistakes could have been avoided if the authorities (government, local authorities) had become aware of the implications of the event earlier:

- the hesitation of the various governments about the site on which to locate the Stade de France and the late selection of the concessionaire weakened the government in its negotiations with the group of firms chosen to build and operate the facility (see below),
- under pressure from the tight schedule, the appointment procedure for the group of designers-builders of the Stadium led to controversies and disputes at the start of the project,
- the tight deadlines led to extra costs during the building of the Stadium, in particular when traces of pollution were discovered in the subsoil; they had not been detected earlier because in-depth surveys had not been carried out,
- the lack of time led to infrastructure developments being essentially limited to the ones necessary to provide easy access to the Stade de France; certain work that would have made it possible to transform the sector was not done before the World Cup.

#### **The constraints imposed by the international organisations**

The balance of power between the powerful International Football Federation (FIFA) on the one hand, and the CFO and French government on the other was weighted in favour of FIFA, which imposed its sponsors (exclusivity contracts). The presence of McDonald's and Coca-Cola, for example, prevented France from highlighting its gastronomy and wines.

**Investment heavily concentrated in the local area**

Most of the investment in the World Cup was made in Ile-de-France in or around Saint-Denis. The event was not a pretext for large-scale urban infrastructure and improvement operations in the metropolis as a whole, which considerably limited the impact of the World Cup geographically.

**Little advantage taken of the new know-how acquired at the event**

Preparing for the World Cup made it possible to change working methods: stronger coordination between the institutions, new modes of international cooperation, information circulation in real time, informal relations between players, transverse nature of the work, experiments on the ground, etc. Full advantage was not always taken of this new know-how.



# RIO DE JANEIRO: The Carnival

The Rio Carnival is an annual event that is an essential part of the city's image and fame and is the mainstay of tourism. A huge popular festival, it mobilises the Cariocas, who identify closely with their Samba schools, throughout the year. The city is making an effort to control this spontaneous event and organise it better. The building of the Sambodrome bears witness to their determination to govern the flow of people, but also the enormous flows of money.



## Rio de Janeiro

Formerly the capital of the country, Rio de Janeiro is still the capital of Rio State (5.8 million inhabitants) and one of the leading cities of Brazil from the cultural, tourist and economic points of view. The natural site of the city is quite exceptional, but breaks the urban space and causes social segregation between districts.

### CHARACTERISTICS

Annual event.

### DATES

The Carnival begins 45 days before Easter and lasts for 3 days.

### PREPARATION

The people of the different districts in the city are mobilised all year round to prepare the Carnival.

### INITIATIVE

Rio de Janeiro city and Rio State.

### MANAGEMENT

*Riotur*, a city structure in charge of organising the event.

### PARTNERS

Rio City, private sector (samba schools).

### TOTAL COST

Estimated expense for *Riotur* in 1999: over 13 m Reals (R\$13 m) [US\$5.9 m 20.04.2001], of which 8 m Reals (US\$3.6 m) consisted of subsidies for the samba schools.

Estimated revenue from television broadcasting rights: 3.2 m Real (US\$1.5 m).

## RECENT EVOLUTION

Since the Second World War, the Carnival has become less spontaneous and more organised. The parade of samba schools (with thousands of people taking part) no longer takes place along *Branco Avenue*, but in a special facility, the *Sambodrome*, with paid admission. Today the Carnival is more for the working classes and the tourists than for the middle and upper classes, who flee the city while it is on.

For several decades, the Rio de Janeiro Carnival has had competition from the others in Salvador, Recife and Olinda. Those cities emphasise the friendlier, more human carnival angle.

## STRATEGY

Carnival is a universal event which has made other cities, such as Venice, Munich or New Orleans, famous. The Rio Carnival has always been a great popular celebration during which the city, life, work and worries come to a stop (services and shops close for 3 days. The city of Rio has to fall in with the Carnival and try to make the most of it. It tries to organise the event and to channel the flow as best as it can.

## STRONG POINTS

### A smooth running event

As it is an annual event, the organisation of the Carnival is a well-tuned instrument.

Roles are clearly distributed:

- the city, working through *Riotur*, takes care of the logistics, the management of the *Sambodrome*, street decorations, the organisation of dances and hiring musicians to get the dances going,
- the private sector and associations, like the samba schools and businesses, form a club which runs the parade,
- the informal sector goes into action (making masks, selling food and drinks, etc.).

The beauty of the site of Rio is an asset in international competition.



Managing an event of this size is very complex. Huge crowds in public places need massive resources of logistics, security, health care, cleaning, and underground trains running all night (they usually stop at 23.00). Carnival management is shared by the city and the samba schools.

#### **A facility designed to make a profit from the event**

The *Sambodrome* (capacity 30,000) was built in the city centre in the 1980s by the architect Oscar Niemeyer. Tourists who used to watch the show free in the street now pay to see the parade. Tickets for the *Sambodrome* now provide an income. Also, since the parade is no longer held in the streets, less is spent on decorations and temporary stands on the pavements. All in all, during the Carnival, 100,000 people parade in the *Sambodrome* before 100,000 spectators taking turns in the building (the final parade lasts from 19.00 to 6.00).

#### **An event that makes the city famous**

The event is reported in the media worldwide. The Carnival provides Brazil with an opportunity to show off its sensuality and *joie de vivre*. It is an excellent way to promote the city of Rio and emphasise its festive image.

#### **An event that is the mainstay of the tourist industry**

For Carnival 2001, 320,000 Brazilian tourists and 20,000 foreign visitors were expected in Rio. More cruise liners are also coming. According to the results of a recent survey, in 1999 110,000 tourists spent US\$80 m during the Carnival.

#### **An event that mobilises the population**

The Cariocas devote a lot of time and energy to making this event a big celebration. Approximately 30,000 people are directly involved in the organisation and management of the Carnival. The major schools use between 110 and 270 people to prepare their parade, a total of 1,500 to 3,000 people. Besides that, *Riotur* employs 1,000 musicians and 2,470 people for different services, and issues 923 licences for informal trade, etc.

The local residents strongly support their particular samba school, which provides a strong sense of belonging to the district, in a spirit of solidarity, but also of competition. A major part of life in the *favelas* is organised around the event for weeks and months before the Carnival.

### **DIFFICULTIES AND QUESTIONS**

#### **Criticisms of the Carnival**

Criticisms are levelled at the Carnival and spread by certain media: an increase in violence and insecurity during the event, an increase in individualism and the competitive spirit, etc.

#### **The impossibility of producing a financial statement**

It is absolutely impossible to produce a financial statement for the Carnival, particularly because of all the informal economy in operation during the event, and the undeclared cash flows.

The cost for public funding is unknown, because the annual event is integrated into the operational budget of the different services.

#### **The use of the *Sambodrome* during the rest of the year**

Halls for use by public samba schools have been built under the stands, but do they function all year round?

## SEVILLE: from the 1992 Universal Exhibition to the 1999 World Athletics Championships

The 1992 Universal Exhibition helped to put Spain on the international map. It gave Seville a modern image and enabled Andalusia to catch up on its backwardness in infrastructures. In 1999, the World Athletics Championships extended the effects of Expo'92 and the city was able to provide itself with an Olympic Stadium. A candidate for the Olympic Games in 2004, and possibly in 2012, Seville seems to be well embarked on the adventure of major events. A big challenge for a small metropolis.



### Seville

The capital of Andalusia, Seville is the fifth largest city in Spain (700,000 inhabitants) and a small European metropolis. The leading river port in the country, the city has a limited industrial base and is turning increasingly towards services and tourism. It is appreciated for its urban and architectural heritage, which bears witness to a distinguished past. Before 1992, its strong cultural identity was founded more on its traditions (flamenco, the Feria, bullfighting) than its modernity.

## 1. The 1992 Universal Exhibition: a leap forward for town-planning, a difficult adaptation of the site

### CHARACTERISTICS

Past event, bid selected by an international organisation, the International Exhibition Bureau (BIE).

### DATES

20 April-12 October 1992 (176 days).

### PREPARATION

November 1982 (bid), 1986 (creation of Expo'92 and approval of the General Exhibition Plan), April 1992 (inauguration) [10 years].

### INITIATIVE

Spanish government.

### MANAGEMENT

*Sociedad Estatal para la Exposición Universal de Sevilla 1992 SA* (State Company Expo'92).

### PARTNERS

City of Seville, autonomous community of Andalusia, European Community, private sector.

### TOTAL COST

Public contribution to Expo'92: Ptas103,530 m (1992) [US\$1,071 m 1.01.1992].

Cost of infrastructures: Ptas942,807 m (1992) [US\$9,758 m 1992].

### INVESTMENT PROGRAMME

- development of the 215 hectares of the Expo'92 site (Isla de la Cartuja), road access (5 new bridges) and public transport (restructuring the rail network, new train and bus stations, overhead cable cars, chairlifts, etc.)
- building exhibition pavilions, service buildings, sports facilities and cultural venues; town-planning (restoring buildings, reclassifying public places)
- building motorway ring roads around Seville and regional motorways in Andalusia
- building a new international airport and a high-speed train line Madrid-Seville (AVE), modernising the river port, etc.

### CONTEXT

In the early 1980s democracy was consolidated in Spain. The government wanted to “jump on the European bandwagon” by negotiating entry into the European Community, and it achieved its aim on 1 January 1986. Spain in general, and Andalusia in particular, received substantial European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) because of their economic backwardness.

### GOALS AND STRATEGY

The bid to organise Expo'92 was a government decision rather than a metropolitan strategy, but one supported by the city of Seville and the autonomous community of Andalusia, which were politically aligned.

The Spanish government used the five hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus (who set sail from Seville in 1491) to put the country on the international map and to foster the development of an economically underprivileged region.

The general goals at the start of the project were:

- to give Spain an innovatory, cutting-edge image by celebrating a period of greatness in its history,
- to use the event to develop transport and telecommunications infrastructures, and to attract investors.

Those goals can be considered on several levels:

- for the city, the aim was to attract as many visitors as possible, and to alleviate the local lack of urban infrastructures and facilities,
- for the region, the aim was to modernise the communications infrastructures and “to define an appropriate development model for the territorial reality” of Andalusia,
- for the country, the challenge was to prove its capacity to organise the event and gain recognition from the international community,
- internationally, Expo'92 was intended to create an “international forum for discussion of matters of planetary importance”.

Revenue from ticket sales was estimated in the 1987 Master Plan at Ptas7 m, which was considered optimistic even within the Plan itself.

#### **STRONG POINTS**

##### **The idea of the exhibition attracted private partners**

Among the event sponsors were four major Spanish banks and many leading international and Spanish companies: Telefónica, IBM, Fuji, Rank Xerox, Alcatel, Phillips, Siemens, Coca-Cola, etc. 116 companies which were mostly small and medium-sized Spanish businesses, bought concessions in the grounds of Expo'92.

##### **A great leap forward for urban and regional development**

The event speeded up the development of the Andalusian capital, providing it with metropolitan standard equipment, which meant a ten-year leap forward: international airport, high speed train station (2h 50 min from Madrid), ring roads, bridges over the Guadalquivir, telecommunications network, technology park, World Trade Centre, Andalusian Institute of Contemporary Art, Omnimax Cinema, etc.

The Exhibition also provided the impetus to restore the major public and private buildings in the city centre, to create fine public areas, and to give the city a new relation with the river by removing the railway track that had run alongside it, which incidentally improved some of the nearby districts.

Regionally, the Andalusian motorway network, along with other infrastructures projected for the Expo, was completed in record time. Apart from the Costa del Sol motorway (which still is not finished), all the building projects were completed on time.

##### **In the end, visitors flocked to Expo'92**

A total of 41.8 million visitors went to the exhibition, according to State Company Expo'92, which was as many as Brussels in 1958, but fewer than Montreal in 1967 (50.8 million) or Osaka in 1970 (64 million). Visitors tended to be “locals”, only 34% were from abroad (24% from the European Community), 20% from Andalusia and 46% from the rest of Spain.



Seville. View of Cartuja Island, site of Expo'92.

#### **The event helped create a modern image for the country and the city**

From the image point of view, the government achieved the goal it had set for Expo'92: the new perception was of benefit to both Spain and Seville, which previously had been famous only for their history and heritage, but were not seen as forward-looking places. Andalusia, which had long had a reputation as a backward region, showed the world that it could be on the cutting edge, with the innovative architecture of bridges and pavilions, high-speed trains (AVE), motorways, etc.

#### **An important contribution to the regional and local economy**

Both before and after the event, the Exhibition greatly stimulated the economy of the city, particularly in the building and public works, and the hotel and catering sectors. An average of 3,140 jobs per year were created directly by Expo'92 from 1985-93, with a peak of 14,000 jobs in 1992-93.

Regionally, the event is estimated to have created 42,900 jobs per year over the period 1987-91, with about 24,000 in the building sector. There was an overall increase of 1.9% per year in the GDP of Andalusia compared with the period before the event. Since the Expo, the marketing effect created by the event has led to a noticeable increase in the number of tourists in Seville, although there are no exact figures. The event changed the economic position of Seville and Andalusia compared with the rest of the country in the technology, services and leisure sectors.

### **DIFFICULTIES AND QUESTIONS**

#### **Difficulties arising before and during the event**

In the years leading up to the event, the tight schedule of building work caused a local labour shortage, which in turn led to increased costs.

During the event, the flow of visitors, particularly in the last weeks of the Expo (630,000 for 3 October 1992 alone), led to long queues (up to 6 hours for the entrance pavilion, sometimes 2 hours to visit a pavilion). A shortage of hotels gave rise to highly inflated prices.

#### **The organisation of the event appears to have ended up with a large deficit**

After the audit of the accounts of the State Company Expo'92, the Spanish accounts court found anomalies in the balance sheet, which showed a profit of Ptas2,437 m for the period 1982-92. The court found that the accounts in fact showed a deficit of Ptas35,258 m. They are still being scrutinised today.

#### **Conversion of the Exhibition site has proved very difficult**

Once the Exhibition was over, the 215 hectares of the site were divided into five zones: technology park, theme park, hotel, university and institutional sectors. The technology park created by the Cartuja'93 company (shareholders: Andalusian community 51%, state 34%, city of Seville 10%) has had enormous commercialisation difficulties, which were a drain on public finances. Big foreign companies steered clear of the site for years, and it is still only partly filled 8 years later. Establishments using the site find themselves with extremely high running costs, because of the high-tech networks they inherited from Expo'92 (air-conditioning, sprinklers, etc.) The economic crisis in Spain, and particularly in Andalusia (32% unemployment in 1993), after the event has no doubt had an influence.

The area of the theme park has also had its ups and downs, with the failure of a first park, followed by the opening of a big amusement park, which has been getting more visitors since 1997. Has it attained financial stability?

### Controversial choices for the development and facilities

The Cartuja site has often been criticised because it is far from the centre (the Institute of Contemporary Art, for example, housed in a restored former monastery, is completely cut off), has limited pedestrian access and a single function programme. The choice of site has given rise to many controversies: an attractive alternative would have been to create Expo'92 on several urban sites on both banks of the Guadalquivir, to integrate it better into the city. On a wider scale, the rapid construction of an extensive motorway network around Seville tends to encourage "non-sustainable" types of development.

Concentrating the construction works in Seville itself has also been criticised. This is no doubt partly responsible for the current shortage of building plots and soaring land prices.

Lastly, some facilities, like Seville airport, seem to be under-used.

### A very large event and site for a small metropolis

Are the global dimension of Expo'92 and the huge size of the site (its 215 hectares are larger than the city centre itself) suitable for a city the size of Seville? Does the city have a sufficiently solid financial and economic base to manage it? That question must be asked, especially in the light of problems of maintenance of grounds and facilities: certain parts of the site look shabby and abandoned now, buildings are falling into disrepair, the cable car no longer works, etc.

## 2. The 1999 World Athletics Championships: after the event, can the Olympic Stadium be made profitable?

#### CHARACTERISTICS

Past event, bid successfully received by an international organisation, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), one of the biggest world sporting events.

#### DATES

20-29 August 1999 (10 days).

#### PREPARATION

1992 (bid submitted to the Spanish federation), February 1994 (official bid), 1997 (decision by the IAAF), 1999 (inauguration) [7 years].

#### INITIATIVE

City of Seville and province of Seville.

#### MANAGEMENT

Organising Committee of World Athletics Championships.

#### PARTNERS

City of Seville, province of Seville and autonomous community of Andalusia, the central government, private partners.

#### TOTAL COST

Organisation expenditure: Ptas3,886 m (US\$20.9 m 20.04.2001).

Organisation revenue: Ptas3,324 m (US\$17.9 m).

Organisation deficit: Ptas437 m (US\$2.3 m).

Expenses for construction of Olympic Stadium: Ptas25,818 m (US\$139 m).

Infrastructure expenses: Ptas6,480 m (US\$34.9 m).

#### INVESTMENT PROGRAMME

Construction of an Olympic Stadium with a capacity of 60,000 and access points from the Seville motorway ring road.



The World Athletic Championships 1999 benefited from the facilities built for Expo'92.

## CONTEXT

The context is a period of political stability and sustained economic growth in Spain (+3.5% per annum). Andalusia still shows signs of underdevelopment compared with other parts of Spain and Europe. Seville wants to prolong the effect of Expo'92 and secure a return on infrastructures built at the time.

## STRATEGY

The original goals were:

- to make the most of an automatically popular event to obtain maximum attendance: 60,000 people per day (capacity of the Olympic Stadium),
- to show Seville as a sporting city, so as to promote tourism and related economic activities. The immediate goal was to provide credibility for Seville's bid for the Olympic Games in 2004.

The bid for the World Athletics Championships was first prepared by the province of Seville (*Diputación*) and the city council. In 1994, the Sevilla'99 bureau was created; in May 1997, the newly created Organising Committee took over. The initial strategy was to seek financial and institutional support from the autonomous community of Andalusia (*Junta de Andalucía*) and from the central government.

## STRONG POINTS

### The event was an opportunity to make the most of the Expo'92 facilities

Apart from the Olympic Stadium, all the facilities used for the Championships in Athletics were already in place before the event.

### The event drew attention to Seville once again

- it benefited from a good television audience,
- it boosted the international image of Seville and increased the interest of foreign visitors in the region,
- 25,550 visitors (in 10 days), including 14,740 foreign visitors (mostly Europe and USA); 11% of the visitors had no connection with the world of sport.

### Economic repercussions

- on activity: increase in local and regional production estimated at Ptas46,493 m (not including tourism),
- on employment: 577 direct jobs (Organisation Committee) and 3,715 indirect and induced jobs over the period 1997-1998 (plus 3,700 volunteers),
- on tourism: increase in number of overnight stays in hotels (+23%, +36% of foreign visitors); increase in average length of stay (from 1.82 to 2.3 nights); increase in the level of occupation; positive financial impact of Ptas3,647 m,
- however, in overall terms, the number of visitors to Seville decreased during the event, because a number of Spanish ones stayed away.

### The people of Seville showed greater interest in sport

## **DIFFICULTIES AND QUESTIONS**

### **Problems of funding and re-use of the Olympic Stadium**

The building of the Olympic Stadium has resulted in a public debt. A plan of action is underway to pay it off. How much is it? Who is carrying it? What means are being used to pay it off?

This financial question goes back to the problem of permanent use of the Stadium, and there is no solution in view to date. On this particular point, the decision was obviously insufficiently thought through, because the capacity of the Stadium (60,000) seems excessive for a city of 700,000 inhabitants.

Faced with these questions, public opinion has been very critical, and this may weaken Seville's chances of building other facilities or hosting other major events.

### **The event itself made a financial loss**

The organisation shows a loss of Ptas437 m (who is bearing it and how?) and expenditure far exceeded the initial budget (+29.7%).

The lack of visitors is one of the main reasons for the deficit: ticket sales were down by Ptas265 m on budgetary provisions (30,000 tickets on average were sold per day for the 60,000 seats). National Lottery revenue was also less than expected.

### **The event seems to have been conceived in isolation**

Was it sufficiently prepared within an overall development project? How was it integrated into other local and national policies?



# International Amities Event Month, Shenyang 1999

The great economic and cultural centre of north-eastern China, the city of Shenyang would like to open up to the world and become better known in order to draw foreign visitors and investors. On the occasion of the 2300th anniversary of its foundation, the city organised a month of international events, International Amities Event Month. Despite the difficulties it was a great success and has had many positive effects for the city.



## Shenyang

Capital of the province of Liaoning, Shenyang is the fifth largest city in China in terms of population (6.8 million inhabitants). It is the industrial, cultural and commercial centre of north-eastern China and a communications crossroads. A highly dynamic city, Shenyang has experience in the organisation of international events (Folk Dance Festival 1992, Asia Sport Festival 1996), but not of world scale ones.

### CHARACTERISTICS

Past event, local initiative, sporting, cultural and commercial.

### DATES

5 to 30 September 1999 (25 days).

### PREPARATION

February 1998- August 1999 (1.5 years).

### INITIATIVE

Shenyang municipal government.

### MANAGEMENT

Organising Commission of the International Amities Event Month, Shenyang

### PARTNERS

Government and private sector.

### TOTAL COST

US\$26 m (excluding infrastructures).

## CONTEXT

The International Amities Event Month was prepared and organised in the context of a local economy which was growing rapidly while also undergoing a complete transformation. The event was part of the 2300th anniversary of the founding of the city.

## GOALS

The organisation of the event focused on three main goals:

- to open the city up to the world and make it better known, with a view to attracting businesses and tourists, and spread new ideas to the residents,
- to ease the transition from a heavy industry economy to a diversified regional capital economy and to improve the facilities,
- to provide entertaining recreational activities for the residents of the city and the region.

## STRONG POINTS

### Making the city better known

The event improved the city's image (modern, open, festive). It made it better known as an active city, but also a city of history and culture, and strengthened its position as the first economic centre of north-eastern China and as one of the foremost metropolises in the country.

### The city proved that it could organise an international event

The local government seems to have managed to coordinate the preparation and management of the event well enough in both human and material terms.

An image of Shenyang.



#### **An open, dynamic economy**

The event helped the city to open up to the "global economy": 3,700 foreign businessmen took part in cooperative projects during the event; 50 of the top 500 companies in the world were represented; the services, trade and real estate sectors developed rapidly; the value of investments grew by 138% between 1999 and 2000 and the number of square metres built increased by 153% (20 points more than in a normal year, according to the city authorities).

#### **A better tourist supply and demand**

The number of tourists was high during the event (29,350 international visitors from 70 countries). This trend has continued since: an increase in the number of tourists (29%), number of hotel beds (20%), of the hotel occupation figures (6 points), creation of a "top range" hotel structure.

#### **Improvement of the standard of metropolitan facilities**

The road network and traffic conditions have improved (5 new main roads built in the city centre); new facilities of use to the metropolis have been built, (Shenyang Science Palace, 21st Century Building, China Automobile Town, Yinji Plaza Chess and Cards Town, Green Island Forest Park).

#### **Improved relations between local players**

Relations between the decision-makers were made easier by the event, and public services functioned more efficiently. Mutual understanding between the local government and the private sector took a step forward: private businesses received sufficient advantages from cooperation with the city to encourage their involvement in the future. Shenyang residents seem satisfied with the event, which has improved their living environment and put their city on the map.

### **DIFFICULTIES**

#### **Problems with the reuse of facilities**

There have been difficulties in reusing the facilities built for the event: the gymnasiums were built a long way from the residential areas and have poor public transport; some buildings were designed for a single purpose, and cannot be adapted for other uses; the management of the facilities has not been adapted.

#### **Insufficient diversification of funding sources**

Other funding possibilities should have been explored, such as partnership with other Chinese cities or with foreign businesses.

#### **Infrastructures that are not always adapted**

The quality of the infrastructures must be improved. Some city squares, like Shifu Square, are not suitable for large gatherings because of the heavy traffic.

#### **Inadequate communication of the city's assets**

An effort must be made to "sell" Shenyang's superb sites and monuments better.

# TORONTO: World Youth Days 2002

For a long time, the city of Toronto has been seeking to improve its place on the North American and international scene. The World Youth Days 2002 will provide an opportunity to host an event which will bring hundreds of thousands of visitors and receive extensive media coverage. The city is expecting short and long-term economic benefits.



## Toronto

The largest city in Canada, Toronto (2.4 millions inhabitants; Greater Toronto: 4.6 million) is on the shore of Lake Ontario. It has been growing rapidly in terms of economy and town-planning for 20 years, fed by high immigration and a rapid expansion of the tertiary sector. The city has experience of international events, but has never organised a world scale one.

### CHARACTERISTICS

International religious gathering, private enterprise bid with support from the public authorities

### DATES

22 July to 28 July 2002 (6 days)

### PREPARATION

Bid: October-November 1998

Creation of the World Youth Days (WYD) National Bureau: September 1999

Preparation: October 1999 - July 2002

### INITIATIVE

Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (CCCCB)

### PARTNERS

City of Toronto, province of Ontario, Canadian government, Vatican, private sponsors

### ORGANISATION

The WYD National Bureau, assisted by the WYD Secretariat (logistics), in association with the Inter-governmental Committee (coordination) and the Municipal Reference Group

### TOTAL COST

Not determined as yet

## CONTEXT

On 1 January 1998 the new Toronto conurbation was constituted by regrouping seven former towns. It has thus become the largest metropolis in Canada, with 2.4 million inhabitants. World Youth Days is the first opportunity for the new "city" to host a major international event.

## GOALS AND STRATEGY

By bidding to host the World Youth Days (WYD) against Montreal and other cities in South Africa, Australia and Bolivia, Toronto is pursuing a number of goals:

- to take its place on the international and national scene and demonstrate its capacity to organise major international events,
- to give an image of a cosmopolitan, welcoming, tolerant, generous city, open to everyone, accessible to disabled people, peace-loving and safe,
- to encourage the development of tourism and the economy: the metropolis is looking to the future, on the principle that the young delegates from all over the world are the decision-makers of tomorrow, and that they will have excellent memories of their stay in Toronto.

The hosting goals are 750,000 participants, about two-thirds of them from abroad (150 countries involved). The target public are young Catholics between 16 and 25 years old.

Down town Toronto.



© laurif - C. Loidier

## **STRONG POINTS**

### **Limited investments**

World Youth Days attract large numbers of foreign visitors and its international impact is by no means negligible, particularly on some continents (Latin America, Africa, Europe). However, it is an event of a particular kind that does not require major resources or investments. The WYD are based on the mobilisation of the residents (especially for reception and part of the accommodation) and existing facilities.

### **A well-equipped city**

Toronto is a well-equipped city with 8,000 hectares of public parks and a large number of churches for the small and medium-sized gatherings. For the large scale festivities it will make its Exhibition Place (75 hectares by the lake) and a major thoroughfare, University Avenue, available to the WYD. For the Papal mass on 28 July, which is expected to attract 1 million people, the site chosen is a large park in the north of the city, Downsview Park.

### **A convincing bid book**

The bid book and the presentation of the metropolis are totally convincing. They highlight its many assets and its capacity to host events of this type.

## **RISKS AND QUESTIONS**

### **Uncertainties**

At present, there are still uncertainties over the capacity of the transport system to take the participants to the venues for the event, particularly Downsview Park for the closing mass. The possible strain on residents and businesses is still unknown. At present, it is impossible to estimate the economic, tourist and social impact of the event.

### **Limited economic results**

The economic and tourist spin-offs of this type of event are relatively minor, compared with other major international events. Although the WYD aims to attract many foreign visitors, they will mostly be accommodated by residents. The experience of the WYD in Paris in 1997 shows that small shops and cafes make the most profit.

Although the event only lasts for a week, there is a risk that the usual tourists may put off or even cancel their visit to Toronto or Canada over a slightly longer period, and they are the ones who bring in the greatest revenue (hotel sector).

### **The question of support from the local population as a whole**

There may be a certain contradiction between this type of event, which only concerns one particular religious group, and the image of a welcoming, tolerant city open to everyone which Toronto is trying to put across by organising it. The event will only concern one part of the residents of the city, and it would be interesting to know what resources Toronto intends to use in order to obtain a general consensus around the project. Is there not a danger that the non-Catholics, who make up 57% of the population, will feel excluded from the festivities?

Is there not a risk that the use of existing facilities, especially local parks and leisure centres, will create a clash of interests with other residents who are not directly involved in the WYD? While some facilities may well be under-used in summer (e.g. the exhibition centre), all the outdoor and recreational facilities are in the middle of their high season, and are used by more people than during the rest of the year.

